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MARKETING CONSERVED WATER 
BY 
MARK SQUILLACE & ANTHONY MCLEOD * 
Water law scholars have long supported water markets for 
addressing critical water needs, especially in arid regions like the 
western United States, and that support seems to be growing among 
policymakers as well. But translating academic theories about water 
markets to the field has proved challenging. To be sure, water can be 
transferred from one use to another use in all western states, but water 
markets in those states are not presently capable of providing 
prospective buyers with a reliable source of water when and where 
they need it. The reasons are myriad, but are primarily related to the 
high transaction costs and significant lead times needed to 
consummate transfers. Under the current system, no municipal water 
supplier in the western United States can guarantee its customers the 
water they demand if they are forced to rely on the availability of water 
on the open market. 
Remarkably, Australia has managed to adapt its water rights 
system in such a way that water markets have flourished. The water 
rights regime in the western United States is different in some 
significant ways from the Australian system, and thus it is unrealistic to 
think that the western states can duplicate Australia’s experience and 
success. But there are important lessons to learn from an Australian 
 
* Mark Squillace is a professor of law at the University of Colorado Law School. Anthony (Tony) 
McLeod is the General Manager of Water Resources Planning at the Murray–Darling Basin 
Authority. In 2014 McLeod undertook a Fulbright Fellowship at the Getches-Wilkinson Center 
for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment at the University of Colorado Boulder. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the significant contribution of Nat Logar, our outstanding 
research assistant.  
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transfer system that has cut approval times for temporary transfers to 
less than five days and for permanent transfers less than twenty days. 
One way for western states to make progress towards developing 
functioning water markets is to cabin the scope of a marketing program 
so that it has a better chance of garnering the support of affected 
parties, and in particular the farmers who will be selling their water to 
cities for domestic and industrial uses. By focusing on “conserved 
water”—defined here as water that was previously but is no longer 
consumed by the water user—states will find it easier to adopt reforms 
that can provide farmers with incentives to make some portion of their 
water available for other uses. Farmers can keep farming even as they 
find ways to use less water to grow profitable crops. 
Agricultural scientists have made great progress towards 
identifying and refining techniques for maintaining stable crop 
production even while using less water. These techniques, which 
include deficit irrigation, crop switching, and rotational fallowing, have 
the potential to free up enough water to serve western communities for 
many years to come, even in the face of severe, sustained drought. But 
the law has yet to catch up with the science, and in most western 
states, transferring conserved water is not legally possible. Even where 
it is allowed, the process remains too cumbersome. This Article begins 
a discussion about overcoming the legal obstacles to marketing 
conserved water and suggests modest and practical reforms to current 
law that could finally open the western United States to robust water 
markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Irrigated agriculture dominates world water use, accounting for 
approximately 70% of water withdrawals and as much as 93% of water 
consumption worldwide.1 Water consumption for agricultural use is 
especially high in the more arid regions of the world where it has the 
greatest potential to create tension with other water needs, especially for 
domestic use.2 And as the demand for water grows and as water resources 
become scarcer, the importance of developing strategies that can move 
agricultural water to other uses has become increasingly urgent. Yet 
wholesale reform of current legal limits on water transfers seems unlikely, in 
 
 1  KERRY TURNER ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WATER RESOURCES IN AGRICULTURE 3 
(2004); UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS’ WORLD 
WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT: BACKGROUND BRIEF (2012), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR4%20Background%20Bri
efing%20Note_ENG.pdf; see also IGOR A. SHIKLOMANOV, WORLD WATER RESOURCES: A NEW 
APPRAISAL AND ASSESSMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 24 (1998) (noting that in 1998 agriculture 
accounted for 67% of total water withdrawal and 86% of consumption). 
 2  UNESCO, Facts and Figures from the United Nations World Water Report 4: Managing 
Water Under Uncertainty and Risk 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 (2012), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWAP_WWDR4%20Facts%20a
nd%20Figures.pdf (discussing regions suffering from absolute water scarcity and noting that in 
Iraq, Oman, Syria, and Yemen, agriculture accounts for 90% of water use). 
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large part because of opposition from the agricultural sector to such reform.3 
For this reason, reform advocates should embrace a narrower effort that 
focuses on transferring “conserved” water, defined here to encompass only 
that portion of water that was previously consumed but that is no longer 
consumed in the agricultural enterprise. If so limited, conserved water 
transfers can be consummated without undermining the economy of local 
farming communities and for that reason should face far less opposition. 
They might even garner agricultural community support. 
Several promising methods for conserving significant amounts of 
agricultural water have emerged from the work of agricultural research 
scientists, including, for example, deficit irrigation, crop switching, and 
rotational fallowing of land.4 Providing farmers with economic incentives to 
adopt these strategies, however, has proved challenging in some parts of the 
world due in large part to the property rights regimes for water.5 Specifically, 
where water rights are defined in terms of “beneficial use” for a particular 
purpose, and where transferring conserved water to other uses is 
constrained by law, as it is, for example, in the western United States, the 
market is not able to function in a way that promotes agricultural to urban 
water transfers, even where the transferred water is made available through 
water conservation by agricultural users.6 
Australia has moved aggressively, and by most accounts successfully,7 
to promote water marketing in the MurrayDarling Basin as a way to 
address severe water deficits in the most populous region of that vast 
country. Australia’s reforms have been far-reaching, going well beyond 
“conserved” water,8 and they may not be practical in other parts of the 
world, including the western United States. Nonetheless, Australia’s 
experience may offer lessons to the western United States and other regions 
of the world as they consider whether and how to use water markets to 
stretch what otherwise might appear to be inadequate water supplies. 
 
 3  See, e.g., TERESA A. RICE & LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, AGRICULTURAL TO URBAN WATER 
TRANSFERS IN COLORADO: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS 2–5 (1993), available at  
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=books_reports_studi
es. 
 4  Bruce Aylward, Environmental Water Transactions: Reducing Consumptive Use, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL WATER TRANSACTIONS: A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 106–07 (Bruce Aylward ed., 
2013), available at http://www.ecosystemeconomics.com/Training_files/Ch_7_EWTs-Reducing% 
20Consumptive%20Use.pdf. 
 5  See id. at 108 (explaining the difficulty of implementing incentive programs). 
 6  See, e.g., RICE & MACDONNELL, supra note 3, at 6–7 (explaining the limitations on water 
transfers under Colorado law). These economic disincentives are often reinforced by a political 
system that tends to favor and protect historic agricultural users. 
 7  See, e.g., M.W. Rosegrant et al., Water Markets as an Adaptive Response to Climate 
Change, in WATER MARKETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 46 (K. William 
Easter & Q. Huang eds., 2014); MICHAEL D. YOUNG, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS AND 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF WATER USE IN AGRICULTURE: THE EXPERIENCE OF AND LESSONS FROM 
THE AUSTRALIAN WATER REFORM PROGRAMME 8 (2010), available at http://www.myoung.net.au/ 
water/publications/OECD_Lessons_paper.pdf. 
 8  See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 7, at 6, 18. 
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This Article begins by examining the opportunities for conserving water 
in the agricultural sector. It asks not only what the opportunities are but also 
what the technical and legal obstacles might be. It then pivots to a 
discussion of the Australian experience with water marketing. In particular, 
it asks whether that experience can help inform an effort to implement 
narrower reforms that would promote agricultural water conservation by 
farmers in the western United States and other parts of the world. This leads 
to a fulsome discussion of strategies for resolving the technical and legal 
obstacles to conserved water transfers in the western United States. The 
Article concludes with a review of specific institutional and legal reforms 
that might be employed to overcome the current obstacles to a robust water 
market. 
II. WATER SAVINGS FROM AGRICULTURAL WATER CONSERVATION 
Not all agricultural water conservation is alike. Water losses that are 
reduced through more efficient delivery systems and application techniques 
may shrink water withdrawals and limit run off from irrigated lands but they 
can also increase water consumption.9 Depending on where the agricultural 
lands are situated, such efficiencies can also deprive downstream users of 
water that they would otherwise receive in the form of agricultural return 
flows.10 Likewise, efficiencies can sometimes have adverse ecological 
consequences, such as where natural streamside vegetation is removed to 
reduce evapotranspiration.11 On the other hand, some promising water 
 
 9  Several methods can be used to change the amount of water withdrawn during delivery 
application. Ditch lining is the installation of an impervious material, such as urethane or 
concrete, in an existing or newly constructed field ditch. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., WATER 
CONSERVATION BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 226–27 (2004), available at 
http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/numbered_reports/doc/r362_bmpguide.pdf. 
Conservatively, concrete linings should be able to salvage 80% of the seepage that would occur 
in an unlined ditch. Id. at 227. Center pivot irrigation describes a number of sprinkler 
technologies where the sprinkler system can rotate around a fixed pivot. Id. at 231–32. 
Depending on the type of system used and the system replaced, new systems can be up to 50% 
higher in application efficiency. Id. Drip irrigation systems allow water to flow directly onto the 
soil, or into the root zone of crop plants. Id. at 234. For corn, researchers in Kansas have found 
that subsurface drip irrigation has the potential to reduce water needs by 25%. F. R. Lamm et al., 
Water Requirements of Subsurface Drip-Irrigated Corn in Northwest Kansas, 38 TRANSACTIONS 
OF THE ASAE 441, 447 (1995), available at http://www.ksre.ksu.edu/sdi/reports/1995/WaterReq. 
pdf. 
 10  UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORG., WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WATER AND ENERGY 60 
(2014), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002257/225741e.pdf. See also Frank 
A. Ward & Manual Pulido-Velazquez, Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use, 
105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 18215, 18219 (2008).  
 11  See, e.g., Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1327 
(Colo. 1974) (holding that water salvaged through the removal of non-native tamarisk was still 
subject to the call of the river). The court’s decision was partially driven by a policy interest; it 
considered “whether the granting of such an unique water right will encourage denuding river 
banks everywhere of trees and shrubs which, like the vegetation destroyed in these cases, also 
consume the river water.” Id. at 1324. However, there are circumstances in which removal of 
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conservation strategies have emerged that actually reduce water 
consumption or evapotranspiration,12 and thus can free up water for other 
uses.13 Importantly, these strategies do not require that agricultural lands be 
retired.14 On the contrary, they encourage farmers to continue farming even 
as water resources are freed for other uses. Three particular water 
conservation strategies are highlighted in this Article. They include: 
1)  Deficit irrigation, where carefully timing and applying water allows 
crops to grow with substantially less than their normal irrigation 
water requirement;15 
2)  Crop-switching, where farmers temporarily or permanently 
transition from high water consumptive crops to low water 
consumptive crops;16 and 
3)  Rotational fallowing, where parcels of land (often the least 
productive parcels) are taken out of production every season on a 
rotating basis to free up a fixed amount of water annually.17 
One American company that is focused on the technical aspects of 
water saving strategies in agriculture such as those described above is 
Regenesis, which has entered into a cooperative research arrangement with 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.18 Their program is designed to: “(1) use 
less water and document the reduction of crop water use (consumptive use 
 
weeds and other nonnative plants, such as those adjacent to ditches, can lead to more efficient 
water transportation and delivery.  
 12  See Sam Geerts & Dirk Raes, Deficit Irrigation as an On-Farm Strategy to Maximize Crop 
Water Productivity in Dry Areas, 96 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 1275, 1277–78 (2009) (discussing 
deficit irrigation as a water optimization strategy); Elias Fereres & María Auxiliadora Soriano, 
Deficit Irrigation for Reducing Agricultural Water Use, 58 J. EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY, 147–48 
(2007) (same); BRIAN MCDONALD, EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES FOR THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE 
REGIONAL WATER PLAN, ALTERNATIVE 11: LOW-WATER CROPS 4–5 (2004), available at 
http://www.dbstephens.com/uploads/directory/fc754183ef684878970c593c36661971/Low_Water
_Crops.pdf (discussing the water-saving alternative of switching from higher to lower water-use 
crops). 
 13  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 148; MCDONALD, supra note 12, at 4–6.  
 14  See Geerts & Raes, supra note 12, at 1278 (discussing how deficit irrigation permits 
farmers in water limited areas to obtain yields that allow economic sustainability, hence 
continued use of the land); Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 148 (discussing how deficit 
irrigation allows for irrigation water to be reduced to a level that will still support agricultural 
lands); MCDONALD, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing switching to less water-intensive corps, 
which keeps agricultural lands in use). 
 15  Geerts & Raes, supra note 12, at 1277; Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 148.  
 16  MCDONALD, supra note 12, at 1, 4. 
 17  Tyler G. McMahon & Mark Griffin Smith, The Arkansas Valley “Super Ditch”—An 
Analysis of Potential Economic Impacts, 49 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 151, 152 (2013). This 
is not meant as an exclusive list and variations and combinations of these strategies may prove 
more efficient in practice. For example, dryland cropping might be an appropriate approach for 
some farm with sufficient natural precipitation. Other examples involve limiting irrigation to 
some period early in the season or limiting the number of cuttings for crops that allow multiple 
cuttings. Some sense of these variations will be provided in the discussion that follows. 
 18  Tom Cech, Regenesis: A New Approach for Irrigated Agriculture, 2 IRRIGATION LEADER, 
Sept. 2011, at 22–23. 
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or evapotranspiration), and (2) maintain historic return flows,” increasing 
returns to irrigators by allowing them to sell surplus water to cities.19 
Regenesis has developed a management tool called Sustainable Water and 
Innovation Irrigation Management (SWIIM).20 This program allows farmers 
to quantify potential water savings by inputting data on cropping patterns, 
field size, water delivery quantities, crop type, deficit irrigation practices, 
crop rotations, and other factors.21 While supporters of the SWIIM program 
have suggested that using this technology should provide sufficient support 
for transferring water in the state of Colorado,22 the legal obstacles to 
concluding such transfers are significant. These legal issues are the subject 
of further analysis later in this Article.23 
Nonetheless, current research would seem to support claims by 
Regenesis and others that certain water conservation strategies can achieve 
substantial water savings.24 Whether these savings can be adequately 
quantified and then translated in such a way as to make water available for 
the needs of other users, however, remains a more open and complex 
question. Before turning to that question, a brief review of current research 
about the three featured water conservation strategies and the water savings 
they might achieve is set forth below. 
A. Deficit Irrigation 
Deficit irrigation (DI) is generally defined as a strategy for maximizing 
efficiencies in the application of irrigation water.25 While it can take different 
forms, it generally promotes water application “during drought-sensitive 
growth stages of a crop,”26 while limiting water applications during other 
periods. While DI can cause stress in crops and lead to decreased 
production, its goal is to maximize water productivity (WP) or crop water 
 
 19  Id. at 22. 
 20  Id. at 23. 
 21  Id. Regenesis claims that SWIIM is an “easy-to-use interface that allows for water and 
crop management while providing for implementation of optimizing technologies and real-time 
monitoring of conserved water.” Regenesis Management Group Enters into Water Optimization 
and Technology Development Agreement with the USDA, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 23, 2010, 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100223005007/en/Regenesis-Management-Group-
Enters-Water-Optimization-Technology (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). SWIIM includes software, 
remote sensing, and instrumentation (including field sensors measuring soil moisture), which is 
directed at allowing water users to fully utilize their water rights. Cech, supra note 18, at 23. 
SWIIM alternatives for management include deficit irrigation (DI), crop rotations, continued full 
irrigation of selected crops, permanent fallowing, rotational fallowing, introduction of dry land 
crops or perennial crops, or combinations of these. Id. 
 22  See Cech, supra note 18 (stating that SWIIM provides answers to key questions posed by 
Colorado’s Water Court regarding efficient water use and monitoring). 
 23  See infra Part V. 
 24  See, e.g., Geerts & Raes, supra note 12, at 1279 (providing a summary of literature 
suggesting that deficit irrigation can increase water productivity). 
 25  Id. at 1277 (describing DI as an “optimization strategy” with the goal and effect of 
maximizing water productivity, despite reducing overall production of fruits and plants). 
 26  Id. 
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productivity (CWP), terms that essentially measure agricultural product per 
unit of water.27 Thus, while deficit irrigation may not maximize the output of 
biomass, it promotes efficiency by establishing the means for farmers to 
grow the most crops for the least amount of water. One form of DI, 
sometimes called regulated deficit irrigation (RDI), involves a fairly 
technical water application process that requires careful monitoring and 
management.28 But DI can also be carried out more simply for some crops by 
simply changing seasonal applications or eliminating one or more cuttings 
from crops like alfalfa that provide multiple cuttings during the growing 
season.29 
DI offers many advantages. Most importantly, with some crops, it can 
significantly reduce water consumption while maintaining or only marginally 
reducing crop production levels.30 Furthermore, by reducing humidity, crops 
may be less prone to fungal outbreaks.31 In addition to its water savings 
potential, DI offers important environmental benefits by limiting the 
leaching of nutrients from soils. This protects farmlands and reduces 
nutrient pollution in waterways.32 
On the other hand, DI requires farmers to carefully manage the 
application of water to crops in terms of both timing and amount. Some 
amount of excess water may be necessary to remove salts from the soil to 
preserve its salt balance, but efficient and well-managed irrigation methods 
can reduce the amount of excess water needed.33 Moreover, while sustained 
 
 27  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 148–50; R. Bradley Lindenmayer et al., Deficit 
Irrigation of Alfalfa for Water-Savings in the Great Plains and Intermountain West: A Review 
and Analysis of the Literature 103 AGRONOMY J. 45, 46–47 (2011) (using the term “water use 
efficiency” to describe the goal of increasing yield while potentially harming productivity). 
 28  William L. Stewart et al., Regulated Deficit Irrigation Reduces Water Use of Almonds 
Without Affecting Yield, 65 CAL. AGRIC. 90, 90–95 (2011) (noting various methods of irrigation 
and explaining the precise measurements required). The article notes that “[t]he objective of 
regulated deficit irrigation is typically to irrigate so that trees experience mild-to-moderate 
levels of water stress, in order to achieve an optimal horticultural balance between vegetative 
growth, which is very sensitive to stress, and fruit production, which is less sensitive.” Id. at 91. 
 29  Lindenmayer et al., supra note 27, at 46–47 (explaining that while variations in harvest 
schedule impact water use efficiency, management is not sensitive according to the variety of 
alfalfa). 
 30  C. Kirda, Deficit Irrigation Scheduling Based on Plant Growth Stages Showing Water 
Stress Tolerance, in WATER REPORTS 22: DEFICIT IRRIGATION PRACTICES 3, 4–5 (Food and Agric. 
Org. of the United Nations ed., 2002), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/agl/aglw/docs/wr22e.pdf. 
 31  See, e.g., David A. Goldhamer, Tree Water Requirements & Regulated Deficit Irrigation, 
in PISTACHIO PROD. MANUAL 103, 103–16 (L. Ferguson et al. eds., 4th ed. 2005), available at 
http://ucmanagedrought.ucdavis.edu/PDF/Pist%20Prod%20Man.2005.pp103-116.pdf (“In 
orchards that have slowly permeable soils and applied water ponds on the soil surface for days 
after an irrigation, or where sprinkler spray patterns are directed into the tree canopies, fungal 
disease is more prevalent. Higher humidity levels in such orchards promote disease activity . . . . 
With poor infiltration rate soils, we have shown that buried drip irrigation can reduce orchard 
humidity, thus reducing incidence of fungal diseases. The key is installing the system such that 
the soil surface is not (or is minimally) wetted throughout the season.”). 
 32  See, e.g., Mustafa Unlu et al., Trickle and Sprinkler Irrigation of Potato (Solanum 
Tuberosum L.) in the Middle Anatolian Region in Turkey, 79 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 43, 66–67 
(2006). 
 33  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 148. 
6_TOJCI.SQUILLACE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  12:48 PM 
2016] MARKETING CONSERVED WATER 9 
DI can maintain a high level of production without substantial biomass loss, 
a decreased harvest index can result if insufficient water is applied to the 
land.34 The harvest index measures the percentage of the plant that is 
harvestable product against the parts of the plant that cannot be used.35 In its 
more technical applications, DI requires precise knowledge of crop response 
to drought stress, as drought tolerance varies considerably by the species or 
subspecies of the crop and with the various stages of growth.36 For many 
crops, a typical strategy would be to irrigate during drought-sensitive stages 
and to restrict water to crops during more drought-tolerant stages.37 Often 
the more drought-tolerant stages fall later in the growth cycle, including 
vegetative and late ripening stages.38 Soil type also influences the 
effectiveness of DI and additional research is needed to catalog the DI 
potential of agricultural regions by soil type and crop. But a look at several 
specific crops suggests that DI holds considerable promise for conserving 
water. 
1. Alfalfa 
Alfalfa is a low WP, high evapotranspiration crop.39 Generally, 
reductions in alfalfa irrigation result in decreases in biomass production.40 
Nonetheless, a report by the Pacific Institute estimates that a realistic 
application of DI for alfalfa grown in the Colorado basin alone could save 
almost a million acre-feet of water per year.41 Although DI under such a 
scenario could result in yield losses of around 25%, the water savings 
achieved could more than justify the crop losses in terms of economic 
efficiencies, and if those efficiencies can be captured through the market, 
irrigators can be afforded incentives that will encourage them to adopt the 
most cost-efficient DI methods.42 
Researchers have studied two different approaches to DI for alfalfa. 
“Partial season” DI involves stopping irrigation during the late summer 
 
 34  Id. at 151. 
 35  Id.  
 36  For example, for many crops, DI applied during specific growth stages, but not in others, 
can result in water savings without crop stress. See Crop Irrigation Strategies, UNIV. OF CALIF. 
DROUGHT MGMT., http://ucmanagedrought.ucdavis.edu/Agriculture/Crop_Irrigation_Strategies/ 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (addressing the different irrigation strategies depending on the type 
of crop). 
 37  See, e.g., Pistachios: Irrigation Management for Pistachio Trees Under Drought 
Conditions, UNIV. OF CALIF. DROUGHT MGMT., http://ucmanagedrought.ucdavis.edu/Agriculture/ 
Crop_Irrigation_Strategies/Pistachios/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (explaining that pistachios 
have some clear drought-tolerant stages during which irrigation is not needed, whereas 
irrigation is recommended during more drought-sensitive stages). 
 38  Geerts & Raes, supra note 12, at 1277. 
 39  Lindenmayer et al., supra note 27, at 47. 
 40  Id. at 46. 
 41  MICHAEL COHEN ET AL., WATER TO SUPPLY THE LAND: IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE 
COLORADO RIVER BASIN 74 (2013), available at http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/ 
2013/05/pacinst-crb-ag.pdf. 
 42  Id. at 63 (citing Lindenmayer et al., supra note 27). 
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months when crop growth is low and water supplies are typically scarce.43 
“Full season” DI reduces total irrigation throughout the irrigation season.44 
Both the Pacific Institute study and an earlier study by Lindenmayer and 
others found that partial season DI offers greater water use efficiency for 
alfalfa than does full season RDI. Still, water savings and crop production 
efficiencies are highly dependent on soil type and climate, suggesting that a 
program to maximize water savings will need to choose carefully the regions 
where DI is employed.45 
Water use for growing alfalfa varies considerably across the country 
and so too does the potential for water savings. For example, the Pacific 
Institute estimates that partial season irrigation of alfalfa in the Palo Verde 
Valley of southern California can reduce irrigation by 22.7 inches from a full 
season average of sixty-eight inches per year, for a water savings of more 
than 33%.46 Of course, such water savings are going to be limited to places 
like the lower Colorado River Basin, with its warmer climate and longer 
growing season.47 In the lower basin of the Colorado River alone this could 
yield savings of 834,000 acre-feet of water.48 Although yields might decrease 
by 25%, the losses would be covered by a purchase price for the water of $62 
per acre-foot.49 This looks especially attractive when compared to the cost of 
seawater desalination proposed for southern California at an estimated cost 
of $1,849–$2,064 per acre-foot.50 
In contrast to the Pacific Institute report, which focused on California, 
Lindenmayer compiled nine different studies in the Great Plains and 
Intermountain West and examined a variety of DI strategies for alfalfa.51 
Lindenmayer found that, on average for that region, DI reduced consumptive 
use of water from alfalfa crops by 4.3 inches per year from a full season 
 
 43  Lindenmayer et al., supra note 27, at 46–47. 
 44  Robert G. Evans & E. Jon Sadler, Methods and Technologies to Improve Efficiency of 
Water Use, 44 WATER RESOURCES RES., July 2008, at 6, available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2007WR006200/epdf (explaining that “under full 
season drought management a given volume is available for distribution within a fixed land area 
over the course of the growing season”). 
 45  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 61; see also, Steve Orloff et al., Controlled Deficit 
Irrigation of Alfalfa: Opportunities and Pitfalls, PROCEEDINGS, CALIF. ALFALFA SYMP., Dec. 2003, 
available at http://ucanr.edu/sites/adi/files/204411.pdf (“The effects of deficit irrigation varied 
depending on the location and soil type.”). 
 46  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41 at 62.  
 47  Id. at 63.  
 48  Id. Farming in the lower basin of the Colorado River occurs primarily in the large 
irrigation districts of southern California, including, most notably, the Imperial Irrigation 
District. See IID History: Water History, IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., http://www.iid.com/about-
iid/an-overview/iid-history (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 49  COHEN ET AL., supra note 45, at 63. Production declines are not linear. Orloff et al., supra 
note 45. Orloff et al. found that alfalfa production is highest earlier in the season, accounting for 
42% of total production in a three-cut season, and 35% for a four-cut season. Cutting off 
irrigation water in mid-July would allow two cuttings or 61% of the total production in a four-
cutting season and 75% for the first two of a three-cut schedule. Id. 
 50  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 63.  
 51  Id. at 62.  
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average of 34.7 inches.52 This corresponds to an approximate savings of 12%. 
Thus, while the potential for water savings is considerably lower than in 
warmer states like California with a longer growing season, every three 
acres of alfalfa grown using RDI in the Great Plains region would still yield a 
full acre-foot of water, thereby potentially making DI a very attractive 
alternative to new water projects or other types of water transfers. 
Looking at the big picture, and combining the potential savings from 
employing DI methods for alfalfa in both the upper and lower basins of the 
Colorado River could yield a 10% reduction in total irrigation water use over 
the entire basin.53 Thus, employing DI methods for just one important crop 
could go a long way towards addressing the water shortage issues that 
currently plague the Colorado River basin. 
Of course, the potential for water savings using DI methods for alfalfa 
extend well beyond the Colorado River basin. In 2014, American land in 
alfalfa production was estimated to be 18.4 million acres (7.45 million 
hectares),54 and the eleven western states, including some of the most arid in 
the country, accounted for approximately 7.4 million acres (3 million 
hectares) of this total.55 Using even the simplest DI method of eliminating 
late season cuttings of alfalfa on these arid lands could yield significant 
quantities of water for water-starved western states while still 
accommodating the productive use of these agricultural lands. 
2. Maize 
RDI employed with maize or corn crops also has the potential to yield 
significant water savings and can sometimes be accomplished without any 
reduction in yield. The key to maximizing RDI for maize lies in limiting it to 
the preflowering and postflowering stages of development of the corn 
plant.56 One study that focused on farming in northwest China found that the 
harvest index of corn increased as a result of careful application of RDI 
during the seedling (preflowering) stage and root elongation (postflowering) 
 
 52  Id.; Lindenmayer et al., supra note 27, at 50. 
 53  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 63.  
 54  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CROP PRODUCTION: 2014 SUMMARY 90 (2015), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/nass/PUBS/TODAYRPT/cropan15.pdf.  
 55  Dan Putnam et al., The Importance of Western Alfalfa Production, U. OF CAL. ALFALFA & 
FORAGE (2000), available at http://alfalfa.ucdavis.edu/+symposium/proceedings/2000/00-001.pdf. 
(Western U.S.: “11 western US states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. These states total 7.4 million acres, or 
31.2% of the US acreage, and produce 33 million tons per year, or 40.5% of the US production of 
alfalfa.”). 
 56  I. Farre & J.-M. Faci, Deficit Irrigation in Maize for Reducing Agricultural Water Use in a 
Mediterranean Environment, 96 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 381, 391–92 (2009) (describing how RDI 
during “stage II,” of development significantly reduced grain yield). Farre and Faci divide the 
growing season for maize into three phases: “(a) from emergence to tassel emergence; (b) from 
tassel emergence to milk stage of grain; [and] (c) from milk stage to physiological maturity.” Id. 
at 385. It is only at the middle stage where full irrigation is advised. 
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stage.57 That study concluded that savings of over 20% could be achieved 
over the whole lifetime of the crop.58 
Farre and Faci studied deficit irrigation in maize crops in northeastern 
Spain.59 In particular, they looked at crops grown in 1995 and 1996 and 
compared plots that used DI at some or all stages of plant development.60 
They concluded that “it is possible to maintain relatively high yields if water 
deficit is limited to periods other than around flowering stage.”61 While they 
found evidence of reduced grain yield with DI employed during the seedling 
stage in 1995 when there was less rainfall than in 1996, the key to 
maintaining good production was full irrigation during the flowering stage of 
the plant.62 They also acknowledged, however, that climate, soil properties, 
and irrigation practices are important factors to consider in deciding 
whether DI should be applied to maize crops.63 
The extent of water savings from using DI for growing maize seems 
harder to quantify than for alfalfa, but the potential water savings is 
nonetheless substantial. The Farre and Faci study, for example, notes that 
for the year 1996, when rainfall was higher, it was possible to obtain yields 
comparable to yields with full irrigation “with a total irrigation volume of 
about half of the crop water requirements.”64 In terms of the western United 
States, the state with the most potential for water savings from using DI 
methods for corn is Colorado,65 which had more than one million acres in 
corn production in 2014.66 Water consumption (or evapotranspiration) for 
corn crops in Colorado has been estimated to be in excess of 16 acre-inches 
per year.67 If DI methods were used to grow corn in Colorado, a conservative 
estimate of water savings based upon a 37.5% savings of 16 acre-inches 
would yield six acre-inches of water.68 Applying DI methods to just half of 
the acreage in corn production would yield more than 250,000 acre-feet of 
water.69 
 
 57  See Shaozhong Kang et al., An Improved Water Use Efficiency for Maize Grown Under 
Regulated Deficit Irrigation, 67 FIELD CROPS RES. 207, 210, 213 (2000). 
 58  See id. at 208, 212 
 59  Farre & Faci, supra note 56, at 383. 
 60  Id. at 386. 
 61  Id. at 393.  
 62  Id. at 392. The study in China suggested that using DI at the early stage of plant 
development was important to the success of DI for maize because it allowed the plants to 
better adapt to drying at later stages. Kang et al., supra note 57, at 213. 
 63  Farre & Faci, supra note 56, at 392.  
 64  Id. 
 65  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 54, at 8. 
 66  Id. 
 67  ANTONY FRANK & DAVID CARLSON, COLORADO’S NET IRRIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR 
AGRICULTURE, 1995 Tbl.1 (1999), http://hermes.cde.state.co.us/drupa/islandora/object/co% 
3A3072/datastream/OBJ/download/Colorado_s_net_irrigation_requirements_for_agriculture__1
995.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) For grain corn the actual evapotranspiration figure is 16.90 
inches. For silage corn it is 16.14 inches. Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. (the total water requirements for both types of corn is 1,359,570 acre-feet; 37.5% of 
half of that total is 254,919 acre-feet). 
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3. Fruit Trees and Vines 
For several reasons, DI strategies may hold the most promise for fruit 
and nut trees and grape vines, even to the point of increasing farmer’s 
profits.70 One big reason for this is that the economic returns from fruit crops 
are generally more closely tied to the quality of the fruit than to the amount 
of biomass produced.71 This is different from grains, where more biomass is 
typically better.72 A second reason for looking closely at using DI for fruit 
trees and vines is that they are generally less sensitive to water deprivation 
at some developmental stages than field crops.73 A final advantage of 
employing DI for fruit and nut trees and grape vines is that they are well-
suited to micro-irrigation systems.74 While these systems are more expensive 
to install and maintain, fruit and nut trees and grape vines tend to generate 
higher income per unit of water used and thus the additional costs 
associated with successfully employing DI strategies can be more easily 
justified.75 
RDI has been successful with several species of fruits, nuts, and vines.76 
Wine grapes in particular seem to benefit from water stress associated with 
DI techniques, but benefits have also been shown for peaches,77 apples,78 
pears,79 citrus,80 almonds,81 and pistachios.82 For example, RDI regimes for 
citrus fruit can reduce water use by up to 25%.83 While the weight of 
 
 70  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 149. See also I. Goodwin & A.M. Boland, Scheduling 
Deficit Irrigation of Fruit Trees for Optimizing Water Use Efficiency, in WATER REPORTS 22: 
DEFICIT IRRIGATION PRACTICES, supra note 30, at 67.  
 71  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 153. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id.; R. S. Johnson & D. F. Handley, Using Water Stress to Control Vegetative Growth and 
Productivity of Temperate Fruit Trees, 35 HORTSCIENCE 1048 (2000). 
 74  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 153. 
 75  See Josué Medellín-Azuarra et al., Jobs Per Drop Irrigating California Crops, CAL. 
WATERBLOG, Apr. 28, 2015, http://californiawaterblog.com/2015/04/28/jobs-per-drop-irrigating-
california-crops/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (showing revenue per net unit of water for various 
California crops). 
 76  Fereres & Soriano, supra note 12, at 154. 
 77  D. A. Goldhamer et al., Effects of Regulated Deficit Irrigation and Partial Root Zone 
Drying on Peach Tree Performance, 592 ACTA HORTICULTURAE, Nov. 2002, at 343. 
 78  Brian G. Leib et al., Partial Root Zone Drying and Deficit Irrigation of “Fuji” Apples in a 
Semi-Arid Climate, 24 IRRIGATION SCI. 85, 85 (2006). 
 79  Peter D. Mitchell et al., Responses of “Bartlett” Pear to Withholding Irrigation, Regulated 
Deficit Irrigation, and Tree Spacing, 114 J. AM. SOC’Y HORTICULTURAL SCI. 15, 17 (1989). 
 80  David Goldhamer, Regulated Deficit Irrigation in Trees and Vines, in AGRICULTURAL 
WATER MANAGEMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP IN TUNISIA 70, 72 (Laura Holliday ed., 2007). 
 81  David A. Goldhamer et al., Regulated Deficit Irrigation in Almonds: Effects of Variations 
in Applied Water and Stress Timing on Yield and Yield Components, 24 IRRIGATION SCI. 101, 113 
(2006); see also Stewart et al., supra note 28, at 93–94 (finding that DI could reduce water 
consumption by 11% for almonds, decreasing kernel size slightly but maintaining the same 
approximate yield). 
 82  F. Iniesta et al., Quantifying Reductions in Consumptive Water Use Under Regulated 
Deficit Irrigation in Pistachio, 95 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 877, 878, 884–85 (2008). 
 83  David A. Goldhamer et al., Evaluation of Regulated Deficit Irrigation on Mature Orange 
Trees Grown under High Evaporative Demand, in CITRUS RESEARCH BOARD 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 
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individual fruits may be slightly reduced, tests show that a larger quantity of 
the fruit produced with DI methods can be classified as “fancy,” rather than 
for juice, which gives it higher value.84 Thus, even with the smaller fruit size, 
growers can achieve higher revenue in many cases.85 
Pistachios offer yet another illustration of the potential value of DI. One 
study, for example, looked at three stages of development for the pistachio 
tree: 1) leaf-out to full shell expansion; 2) full shell expansion to the onset of 
rapid kernel growth; and 3) rapid kernel growth to harvest.86 The study found 
that irrigating at 50% of normal during stage 2 and reducing irrigation of 
trees by 70% after harvest would reduce overall water consumption by 23.2% 
without adversely impacting the harvest.87 
A current study in New Mexico is also looking at potential benefits to 
pecan farmers.88 Mature pecan trees have been estimated to use from thirty-
nine to fifty-one inches of water annually and thus the potential for water 
savings from DI would seem to be substantial.89 
4. Rapeseed 
Rapeseed is a crop of increasing importance that is grown for its high 
oil content.90 In 1975, for example, worldwide rapeseed oil production stood 
at 8.8 million metric tons.91 By 2006, that figure had increased more than five-
fold to 47 million metric tons.92 A hybrid of rapeseed is canola, which is 
commonly used for cooking. Industrial uses for rapeseed oil include 
lubricants and plastics manufacturing.93 Employing DI strategies for 
rapeseed production could save a significant amount of water, especially in 
arid and semi-arid regions. In one study that applied different amounts of 
irrigation water and nitrogen to test fields, researchers found that grain yield 
could be retained in a DI scenario when normal or high amounts of nitrogen 
 
16, 18 (2000), available at http://citrusresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2000-
GOLDHAMER1.pdf. 
 84  Id. at 17. 
 85  Id. at 18 (noting that “the highest gross revenues of all 14 irrigation treatments were the 
two early season stress [DI] regimes,” leading the authors to conclude that with “early season 
RDI . . . applied water can be reduced by 25% relative to fully irrigated trees without reducing 
gross revenue”).  
 86  David A. Goldhamer & Robert H. Beede, Regulated Deficit Irrigation Effects on Yield, 
Nut Quality and Water-Use Efficiency of Mature Pistachio Trees, 79 J. HORTICULTURAL SCI. & 
BIOTECH. 538, 539 (2004). 
 87  Id. at 544. 
 88  Richard Heerema et. al., Seasonal Timing of Regulated Deficit Irrigation in Pecans, N.M 
STATE UNIV., http://aces.nmsu.edu/rgbi/richard-heerema.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 89  Charles Rohla, Shaping up Pecans with Irrigation, AG NEWS & VIEWS, Feb. 2012, available 
at http://www.noble.org/Global/ag/news-views/2012/02/shaping-up-pecans.pdf. 
 90  Soyatech, Rapeseed Facts, http://www.soyatech.com/rapeseed_facts.htm (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2016).  
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Michael Boland, Rapeseed, AGRIC. MKTG. RES. CTR., Mar. 2012, http://www.agmrc.org/ 
commodities-products/grains-oilseeds/rapeseed/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
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were applied.94 For this study, all fields were flood irrigated in the same 
manner and amount through the stem elongation phase, and DI fields were 
irrigated only half as frequently after that.95 With a 40% reduction in water 
irrigation, rapeseed crops experienced only an 8% reduction in grain yield.96 
Table 1 summarizes some of the available data on water savings that 
might be expected from RDI. While the potential for savings is substantial, 
the application and ultimate expansion of DI programs will likely be limited 
by the practical obstacles to transferring water saved by such methods. 
Water savings, while real, are highly dependent on crop type, soil conditions, 
and climate.97 In particular, and as described in the concluding section of this 
Article, establishing pilot water transfer projects for farmers who employ DI 
techniques should probably focus on particular basins with particular crops, 
climate, and soil profiles. As more is learned about the water saving 
advantages of DI, these projects might be expanded to other crops and other 
regions. 
Table 1: Potential Water Savings from DI 
Crop Potential Water Savings Potential Yield Reductions 
Alfalfa98 up to 33% (varies by region) ~25% (varies by region) 
Maize99 over 20% no significant reduction 
Rapeseed100 40% 8% 
Almonds101 11% 
little decline, but slightly smaller 
kernel size 
Pistachio102 23.2% no reduction 
Citrus103 25% 
no decrease in profits (reduced yield, 
but higher quality) 
 
 94  Javad Hamzei & Jalal Soltani, Deficit Irrigation of Rapeseed for Water-Saving: Effects on 
Biomass Accumulation, Light Interception and Radiation Use Efficiency Under Different N 
Rates, 155 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 153, 160 (2012).  
 95  Id. at 154. 
 96  Id. at 155 tbl.1. 
 97  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 62.  
 98  Id. at 62–63 (citing Lindenmayer et al., supra note 27). The 33% estimate reflects the 
highest value for potential water savings, typically in wetter places with longer growing 
seasons, such as the Lower Colorado River Basin. Id. at 62. In the lower basin with a warmer, 
longer growing season, total consumptive use of water is much higher, but there is a potential 
to save a greater percentage. Id. at 63. For the entire Colorado River Basin, average water 
savings would probably be closer to 10%. Id. 
 99  Kang et al., supra note 57, at 212. The number reflects a scenario in which DI is 
performed during stem elongation, with only mild reductions of 20% in later phases. Id. If 
applied during a sustained period, increased DI will lead to reduced biomass for maize. Id. at 
209.  
 100  Hamzei & Soltani, supra note 94, at 155 tbl.1.  
 101  Stewart et al., supra note 28, at 93–95. 
 102  Goldhamer & Beede, supra note 86, at 544.  
 103  Goldhamer et al., supra note 77, at 17.  
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B. Crop Switching 
Different crops consume vastly different amounts of water, and even 
among individual crops, different strains are available that can significantly 
reduce water consumption. While water consumption rates can vary 
depending on soil conditions, climate, slopes, and other factors, crop 
switching clearly has the potential to achieve significant water savings. For 
example, in the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) Basin in New Mexico, researchers 
have studied crop switching from alfalfa to sorghum—crops that are both 
grown in the MRG Basin.104 Alfalfa is far more water-intensive, consuming 
28.2 inches of water per acre annually in the Belen, New Mexico area.105 By 
comparison, sorghum grown in the same region consumes only 17.94 inches 
of water per acre.106 Switching 5,000 acres from alfalfa to sorghum would 
reduce consumptive water use by an estimated 4,275 acre-feet per year of 
water.107 While the water savings per acre would be more modest, switching 
all current alfalfa acreage in the MRG Basin to an available alfalfa variety 
that uses 15% less water would reduce annual consumptive water use by 
7,473 acre-feet108 in a planning region that encompasses over 5,000 square 
miles.109 
In the Walker Basin in northwest Nevada, researchers studied the 
feasibility and potential water savings that would result from replacing 
alfalfa with alternative crops.110 A field study demonstrated that water 
consumption could be reduced by at least half.111 Replacement crops 
included lettuce, grapes, barley, wild rye, teff, switchgrass, and onions.112 
When farmers had access to water at current levels, alfalfa remained the 
least economically risky option, but several other crops both saved water 
and had the potential to yield significant profits for the farmers. Onions were 
the optimal choice for water savings and financial stability.113 
One recent study illustrates the potential water savings that might be 
achieved from crop switching.114 It looked at three different scenarios in the 
Lower Basin of the Colorado River.115 In the first scenario, shifting 80,000 
acres from cotton to wheat would yield a potential savings of 101,000 acre-
 
 104  MCDONALD, supra note 12, at 1. 
 105  H.F. BLANEY & E.G. HANSON, CONSUMPTIVE USE AND WATER REQUIREMENTS IN NEW MEXICO 
64 (1965), available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Pub/TechnicalReports/TechReport-032.pdf. 
 106  Id. 
 107  See MCDONALD, supra note 12, at 1. 
 108  Id. 
 109  MIDDLE RIO GRANDE WATER ASSEMBLY, MIDDLE RIO GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLAN ES-1 
(2004), available at http://www.waterassembly.org/archives/MRG-Plan/C-Summaries/Rio%20 
Grande%20Executive%20Summary.pdf. 
 110  Carol D. Bishop et al., Conserving Water in Arid Regions: Exploring the Economic 
Feasibility of Alternative Crops, 103 AGRIC. SYS. 535, 535 (2010). 
 111  Id. at 536. 
 112  Id. at 537. 
 113  Id. at 540–41. 
 114  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 64–65. 
 115  Id.  
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feet of water.116 In the second scenario, shifting 74,000 acres from alfalfa to 
sorghum would save more than 140,000 acre-feet of water.117 Finally, in 
scenario three, shifting 74,000 acres of alfalfa to equal amounts of cotton and 
wheat would yield a whopping 250,000 acre-feet of water.118 
Research on the potential for water savings from crop switching is 
summarized in Table 2. The Table describes rough water consumption levels 
for different crops as compared with water consumption by alfalfa. While 
actual consumption will vary depending on crop varieties, soil type, and 
climatic conditions, the Table offers a rough sense for the enormous 
potential for water savings from crop switching. 
  
Table 2: Average Crop Water Consumption119 











alfalfa baseline (%) 
Alfalfa 800–1600 
(508–1200)120 
1025 3.3625 0 
Barley 450–650 550 1.804 46% 
Bean 300–500 400 1.313 61% 
Beets 254–381121 317.5 1.042 69% 
Potato 500–700 600 1.968 41% 
Sorghum 450–650 550 1.804 46% 
Soybeans 450–700122 575 1.887 44% 
Sugar beet 550–750 650 2.133 37% 
Sunflower 600–1000 800 2.625 22% 
 
 116  Id. at 64. The study first suggests shifting 70,000 acres of cotton to wheat but then talks 
about saving 101,000 acres from shifting 80,000. It appears that it was this latter number that 
was intended. L. J. Erie et al., Consumptive Use of Water by Major Crops in the Southwestern 
United States, USDA-ARS CONSERVATION RES. REP., NO. 29 (1982), available at 
https://cals.arizona.edu/crops/irrigation/consumuse/conusefinal.pdf. (claiming that 15.4 inches 
of water would be saved for each acre shifted from cotton to wheat). Multiplying this number 
by 80,000 and dividing by 12 to convert inches to feet yields 102,667, which is a bit more water 
saved than claimed in the study. 
 117  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 64–65.  
 118  Id. at 65. 
 119  Unless cited individually, all column two numbers come from: C. BROUWER & M. 
HEIBLOEM, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., IRRIGATION WATER MANAGEMENT: IRRIGATION WATER NEEDS, 
PART I, Tbl.4, available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-s2022e/index.html (in the Table of Contents, 
under “Part I- Principles of Irrigation Water Needs,” click on “2.4– Determination of Crop Water 
Needs”). All calculations in columns three, four, and five are based on numbers from column 
two. 
 120  Alternative estimate from Glenn E. Shewmaker et al., Alfalfa Irrigation and Drought 1, 
(2013), available at http://www.extension.uidaho.edu/forage/Fact%20Sheets/Alfalfa%20Irrigation 
%20Facts%202013%20Final[1].pdf (converted from inches per season to approximate 
millimeters per season).  
 121  FRANK DANIELLO, ESTIMATED WATER REQUIREMENTS OF VEGETABLE CROPS (2003), available 
at http://extension.missouri.edu/sare/documents/estimatedwaterrequirementsvegetable2012. 
pdf (converted from inches per season to millimeters per season).  
 122  FAO Land & Water Div., Crop Water Information: Soybean, U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/cropinfo_soybean.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
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Table 2: Average Crop Water Consumption Continued 











alfalfa baseline (%) 
Sweet 
potato 
254–508123 381 1.25 63% 
Wheat 450–650 550 1.804 46% 
 
Table 2 illustrates that significant water savings can be achieved by 
switching from high-use crops to those that require less water. For example, 
assuming mean consumption rates, 10,000 acres of farmland dedicated to 
alfalfa would consume 33,625 acre-feet of water, whereas a switch to 
soybeans would consume 18,870 acre-feet, thereby saving 14,755 acre-feet 
over that area. Likewise, a switch of 10,000 acres from alfalfa to beets would 
yield 23,205 acre-feet of water, and a switch from alfalfa to sweet potatoes 
would yield 21,125 acre-feet. 
C. Rotational Fallowing 
A third strategy for reducing water consumption while protecting rural 
agricultural economies is rotational fallowing. The goal of rotational 
fallowing is to leave a small percentage of lands uncultivated every year on a 
rotating basis to achieve a consistent, measurable quantity of water savings 
that can then be marketed to other users.124 While rotational fallowing could 
leave fewer acres in agricultural production each year, it appears to offer 
significant benefits to farmers and agricultural communities that eluded 
them during the “buy and dry” land purchases of the past.125 By rotating less 
productive lands and allowing nutrient-depleted lands to be replenished, the 
lands that remain in production can potentially realize higher agricultural 
yields.126 
The most famous example of rotational fallowing in the U.S. involves an 
agreement between the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) and the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD). PVID 
encompasses more than 131,000 acres in Southern California.127 In the early 
2000s, PVID entered into a long-term agreement with MWD to implement 
land fallowing, crop rotation, and water supply programs, where land is 
allowed to lie fallow on one- to five-year rotational periods.128 The program 
 
 123  DANIELLO, supra note 121. 
 124  Ed Smith, Palo Verde and MWD’s Land Management, Crop Rotation and Water Supply 
Program, in WATER SHARING: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN AND THE 
WEST 24 (2011), available at http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/sr/22.pdf.  
 125  McMahon & Smith, supra note 17, at 160–61.  
 126  METRO. WATER DIST. OF S. CALIF., PALO VERDE LAND MANAGEMENT, CROP ROTATION AND 
WATER SUPPLY PROGRAM [hereinafter PALO VERDE PROGRAM] available at http://www.mwdh2o. 
com/PDF_NewsRoom/6.4.2_Water_Reliability_Palo_Verde.pdf.  
 127  Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., History of PVID and the Palo Verde Valley, 
http://www.pvid.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 128  PALO VERDE PROGRAM, supra note 126. 
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pays farmers to temporarily cease irrigating some lands.129 Each year, the 
program provides MWD with an estimated 25,000 to 118,000 acre-feet of 
water for municipal use.130 In addition to making substantial water resources 
available to the MWD, one of the program’s goals is to ensure that those 
fallowed lands become more productive.131 In the PVID, short-term fallowing 
has led to increased soil organic matter and nitrates, increased nutrient 
cycling, and improved soil quality, crop growth, and production.132 
Several mutual ditch companies in Colorado have banded together in an 
attempt to replicate the success of the PVID fallowing program.133 The 
Arkansas Valley Super Ditch, as it is commonly known, is a far more 
complex project because it involves multiple irrigation districts and it 
expects to engage multiple buyers for its water.134 Like the PVID program, 
however, it would allow the farmers to retain their water rights, without 
permanent transfer, and it would make water available through a rotational 
fallowing system.135 One study of the economic effects of the proposed 
project found that it would benefit local agriculture by infusing a steady flow 
of annual income through lease payments and increasing the amount of 
dryland farming.136 The Super Ditch has been touted as a means for 
continuing agricultural productivity, maintaining economic activity in 
agricultural communities, and keeping a substantial amount of water for 
irrigation use while at the same time providing urban areas with much 
needed new water supplies.137 
III. IDENTIFYING THE TECHNICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 
As the previous Section suggests, it is possible to describe with 
specificity the theoretical water savings that can be achieved through DI, 
crop switching, and rotational fallowing. Nonetheless, significant technical 
and legal questions remain to be answered before a robust water market in 
conserved water can be realized. For example, if a farmer agrees to switch 
to a less water intensive crop, how are the savings calculated, who 
determines how much water is conserved, and how is that water savings 
verified over time? Can transfers based upon water conservation strategies 
be permanent, or at least long-term, or should they be limited to seasonal or 
 
 129  Id.  
 130  Id.  
 131  Id.  
 132  Jeremy Cusimano & Vonny Barlow, The Effects of Short-Term Fallowing on Soil Quality 
and Crop Growth, POSTINGS FROM THE PALO VERDE, (June 2013), available at 
http://ceriverside.ucanr.edu/newsletters/Postings_from_the_Palo_Verde_Valley47703.pdf. 
 133  Peter Nichols, Irrigators Negotiate Municipal Water Leases, Keep Water Ownership, in 
WATER SHARING: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN AND THE WEST 25. 
 134  PETER NICHOLS, SLIDES: LOWER ARKANSAS VALLEY SUPER DITCH COMPANY, INC.: WATER 
LEASING PROGRAM, 6–8 (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/evolving-
regional-frameworks-for-ag-to-urban-water-transfers/2. 
 135  McMahon & Smith, supra note 17, at 152. 
 136  Id. at 160. 
 137  Nichols, supra note 133, at 32.  
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annual transfers? Furthermore, over what geographic region or basin can 
conserved water be marketed and what institutional framework is needed to 
operate temporary (seasonal) and permanent water markets? Finally, what 
legal obstacles exist to establishing such markets, and can a marketing 
program be designed that can overcome the political and practical obstacles 
to a well-functioning water market? Some lessons and answers can be drawn 
from the Australian experience and these are addressed more fully in a later 
Section of the Article.138 But the legal and policy dimensions of establishing 
and operating a water market in any particular jurisdiction are likely to be 
sui generis and thus the lessons to be drawn from experiences in other 
states, while offering significant value, must be approached with caution. 
A. The Technical Issues 
In addition to legal and institutional issues, technological advances may 
also aid in overcoming obstacles to effective water resource management. 
The efforts by Regenesis, which were described briefly above, suggest one 
approach for using technology for enhanced water distribution systems.139 
Additionally, remote sensing systems for monitoring crops could be a boon 
to resource managers. Remote sensing tools have been used to monitor 
evapotranspiration, measure agricultural performance, follow patterns of 
water use, monitor operations through field wetness indicators, and evaluate 
the impact of irrigation policies.140 Furthermore, the expanded use of drones 
in the agricultural sector could offer an efficient and effective means for 
monitoring agricultural practices. One newspaper account, for example, 
describes using drones for applications such as “identifying insect problems, 
watering issues, assessing crop yields or tracking down cattle.”141 Identifying 
crop types and total acreage in production would seem to be rather 
elementary extensions of existing drone uses. 
In addition, software suites are available that can integrate yield maps, 
light detection and ranging (LIDAR), elevation maps, and soil surveys for 
water management.142 LIDAR itself—with its usefulness for assessing flow 
rates and drainage, along with soil loss and other variables143—could be 
useful when applied in agricultural contexts. Such technical tools have the 
 
 138  See infra Part IV.D. 
 139  See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
 140  Wim G.M. Bastiaanssen et al., Remote Sensing for Irrigated Agriculture: Examples from 
Research and Possible Applications, 46 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 137, 139–43 (2000). 
 141  Christopher Doering, Growing Use of Drones Poised to Transform Agriculture, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 23, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/23/drones-
agriculture-growth/6665561/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 142  See, e.g., Ag. Leader, Water Management Module, http://www.agleader.com/products/ 
sms-software/advanced/water-management-module/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (advertising a 
suite with these features). 
 143  Stephanie Johnson & Zach Hermann, Presentation to Watershed Professionals Network: 
Prioritizing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Management Areas Through the Use of LiDAR and 
GIS (Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document. 
html?gid=19418. 
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potential to make water management more responsive to changing 
conditions and more effective. 
B. The Legal Issues 
Technical research on innovative water conservation strategies is 
ongoing, and while more work is plainly needed, it is long past the time for 
addressing some of the legal and institutional impediments to transferring 
conserved water. In Colorado and most other western American states, for 
example, water conserved by the methods described here cannot legally be 
transferred or sold to urban, industrial, environmental, or any other potential 
users.144 It cannot even be transferred to other agricultural land.145 This is 
because most western states define property rights in water only in terms of 
the type and place of use and the amount authorized for diversion.146 Thus, 
while a Colorado farmer can use agricultural water rights to grow any crops 
during the growing season on the particular lands for which that water was 
appropriated, that farmer cannot sell water that might be conserved by 
switching crops or fallowing land, even if the farmer commits to a 
permanent change in her past practice. This is because the scope of a water 
right has traditionally been legally limited to the reasonable, beneficial 
quantity of water needed to grow any crop the farmer chooses to grow on 
the particular land for which the water was appropriated.147 Moreover, since 
future transfers of agricultural water rights are typically based upon 
historical consumptive use,148 farmers in most western prior appropriation 
states have a perverse incentive to consume as much water as possible over 
 
 144  See Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. Kovacovich, 411 P.2d 201, 202–03 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1966) (“This Court is of the opinion that the Doctrine of Beneficial Use precludes the 
application of waters gained by water conservation practices to lands other than those to which 
the water was originally appurtenant.”); see also Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton 
Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974) (“Salvaged waters are subject to call by prior 
appropriators.”). California appears to be the only prior appropriation state that recognizes a 
right to transfer conserved water. See CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS 
(1999), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/watertransferguide.pdf (explaining 
California’s water transfer system). 
 145  This follows from the principle that water rights are appurtenant to the land for which 
they are appropriated and cannot be used on other lands unless the water rights are transferred 
pursuant to the relevant state process. See, e.g., McCray v. Rosenkrance, 20 P.3d 693, 702 (Idaho 
2001) (“It is clearly the law in Idaho that a water right cannot be resumed when the facts clearly 
establish that water was not applied to the land of which it was appurtenant.”). 
 146  See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999) 
(stating that “the right to change a water right is limited to that amount of water actually used 
beneficially pursuant to the decree at the appropriator’s place of use”). 
 147  See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 35 (2d ed. 1988) (indicating that irrigation is a 
beneficial use, without reference to what crop is being grown on the irrigated land). 
 148  See Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo. 
2001) (stating that “[c]hanges of water rights are limited in quantity and time by historic use”). 
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the long-term to maximize the future value of the right should it eventually 
be sold.149 
An additional problem concerns the high transaction costs associated 
with transferring water under the current system of laws in most western 
American states. Under these systems, water cannot generally be transferred 
unless the transferor can demonstrate that the transfer will not cause any 
injury to other users in the system.150 Injury can be shown, for example, if the 
timing of return flows to the stream changes, and the law generally affords 
no exception for de minimis injuries.151 
California has done more than any other state in removing obsolete 
legal standards and seeking to overcome the obstacles to transferring 
conserved water. For example, the California Water Code now provides that 
where water use “has ceased or been reduced as a result of water 
conservation efforts . . . [it] may be sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise 
transferred pursuant to any provision of law relating to the transfer of water 
or water rights.”152 In addition, California expressly authorizes temporary 
transfers of water 
if the transfer would only involve the amount of water that would have been 
consumptively used or stored by the permittee . . . in the absence of the 
proposed temporary change, would not injure any legal user of the water, and 
would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial 
uses.153 
To help facilitate these and other innovative approaches to water transfers, 
the California Water Resources Control Board published a draft guide to 
water transfers in 1999,154 and provides additional information and assistance 
 
 149  See GOLDFARB, supra note 147, at 35–36 (explaining that irrigation uses of water can lead 
to significant waste in prior appropriation states, as farmers have an incentive to pad their 
water use to prevent forfeiture of unused water). 
 150  See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1701.2(d) (West 2015) (providing that a petition for a permit 
change must “include sufficient information to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the 
proposed change will not injure any other legal user of water”). 
 151  See, e.g., Britt Banks & Peter Nichols, A Roundtable Discussion on the No-Injury Rule of 
Colorado Water Law, 44 COLO. LAW., July 2015, at 87 (describing how Colorado water law 
experts “felt that as Colorado law is currently applied, any impact appears to constitute injury 
and there is no de minimis or other practical materiality standard to define injury”); BARTON H. 
THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 307–12 (5th 
ed. 2013) (demonstrating application of the no injury rule). 
 152  CAL. WATER CODE § 1011(b) (West 2015). “Water conservation” is defined by the statute 
to encompass “the use of less water to accomplish the same purpose . . . allowed under the 
existing appropriative right.” Id. § 1011(a). Land fallowing and crop rotation are also expressly 
included within the scope of the definition.  
 153  Id. § 1725.  
 154  CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., A GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS (draft) (1999), 
available at: http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_ 
transfers/docs/watertransferguide.pdf [hereinafter Draft Water Transfer Guide]. 
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on transfers at its website, including basic information about specific 
transfers going back to 2009.155 
Notwithstanding these important reforms, California does not seem to 
have had much success in promoting transfers of conserved water. Perhaps 
that is because the process for transferring water in California—even for a 
single year—remains cumbersome. In particular, while temporary changes 
of less than one year are exempt from the environmental impact reporting 
requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act,156 ad hoc 
determinations about potential injury to other users and to fish and wildlife 
must still be made.157 
Any serious hope that water conservation strategies can be used to help 
satisfy water demands for other uses will apparently require some further 
changes to the current legal standards for transferring water. And such 
changes seem unlikely to be enacted unless the farming community can be 
persuaded that the changes are in their long-term best interests. Before 
suggesting a path forward, a look at the evolution of water transfer policies 
in Australia is instructive. 
IV. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE WITH WATER MARKETS 
In an effort to inform possible pathways for opening water markets in 
the western United States and in other countries, a comparison with water 
marketing in Australia, particularly in the MurrayDarling Basin of southeast 
Australia, is instructive.158 Australia is the driest inhabited continent on earth 
and the inter-annual variability it experiences in rainfall and runoff is among 
the highest in the world.159 The approaches to water sharing that have been 
developed in the Basin are highly adapted to this variability.160 
While Australia’s wider legal history is derived mainly from the United 
Kingdom, a key departure from this tradition occurred through a process of 
nationalization of water rights in the late nineteenth century and the creation 
of a system of statutory water rights. This departure occurred first in 
Victoria in 1886 and the other (then) colonies in the decade or so 
 
 155  Calif. State Water Res. Control Bd., Water Transfers Program, http://www.waterboards. 
ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_transfers/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 156  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21178.1 (West 2007); see Draft Water Transfer Guide, 
supra note 154, at 6-1. 
 157  See id. at 6-3 tbl.1. 
 158  The MurrayDarling Basin encompasses a one million km2 catchment across parts of 4 
states and all of one territory. MurrayDarling Basin Authority, Basin Geography, 
http://www.mdba.gov.au/discover-basin/landscape/geography (last visited Feb. 13, 2016); see 
also MurrayDarling Basin Authority, Basin Boundary, http://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/ 
files/cartographicmapping/8_Murray-Darling_Basin_Boundary.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 159  See I. Neave et al., Managing Water in the MurrayDarling Basin Under a Variable and 
Changing Climate, 42 WATER: J. AUSTL. WATER ASS’N, Apr. 2015, at 102 (explaining that 
“Australia has one of the most variable climates on Earth”); Peter Hillis & Jason Fonti, 
Opportunity or Bust? Infrastructure Financing in the Water Industry, 42 WATER: J. AUSTL. WATER 
ASS’N, Apr. 2015, at 74 (describing Australia as “the driest inhabited continent”). 
 160  See id. at 102, 104. 
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thereafter.161 The system of water rights in Australia, as compared to the 
United States, is an area ripe for fertile investigation, with Peter Davis 
providing the standard comparative study.162 John Tisdell has written a 
useful complement to this work, setting out the evolution of water 
legislation in Australia.163 
By way of overview, each of the state and territory governments that 
comprise the MurrayDarling Basin have established their own water rights 
systems. These systems generally include a state based licensing program 
for forms of water use other than stock and domestic uses.164 Depending on 
the state, water rights are assigned to various classes165—and these classes 
are used to ration water based on availability.166 Higher security rights enjoy 
a preference and thus a more reliable supply as provided under the water 
resource planning instrument appropriate to a given system.167 Water rights 
within each class enjoy no temporal priority and notions of “prior 
appropriation” do not apply. The issuance of these rights took various forms 
and were at times specified as an area of land or tied to particular uses.168 
From the 1980s in particular, a process of volumetric conversion of major 
classes of water rights improved the transparency and the basis for rationing 
water within and across classes.169 
The evolution and history of water markets in Australia have been 
documented by the National Water Commission.170 Sarah Wheeler and her 
colleagues have further provided an overview of the development and 
impact of water marketing arrangements in Australia since the 1980s.171 
Quentin Grafton and others have made a detailed comparative assessment of 
water markets in Australia and the United States, with particular insights 
from the MurrayDarling Basin and the western United States, including the 
 
 161  P.N. Davis, “Nationalization” of Water Use Rights by the Australian States, 9 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 1, 1, 3 (1975); WARREN MARTIN, WATER POLICY HISTORY ON THE MURRAY RIVER: A 
HAND BOOK FOR MURRAY IRRIGATORS 306–08 (2005).  
 162  Peter N. Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 647 (1968). 
 163  John Tisdell, The Evolution of Water Legislation in Australia, in WATER MARKETS FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY: WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED (K. William Easter and Qiuqiong Huang, eds., 2014). 
 164  Id. at 165. 
 165  See, e.g., NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER MARKETS IN AUSTRALIA: A SHORT HISTORY 58 
(2011), [hereinafter WATER MARKETS IN AUSTRALIA] available at http://archive.nwc.gov. 
au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/18958/Water-markets-in-Australia-a-short-history.pdf (describing 
how New South Wales differentiates between High Security and General Security rights). 
 166  See id. at 57–58 (describing the rationing systems of Victoria, New South Wales, and 
South Australia). 
 167  Id. at 57. 
 168  See, e.g., MurrayDarling Basin Auth., History of Water Licenses in Australia, http://www. 
mdba.gov.au/what-we-do/managing-rivers/water-trade/history-of-water-licenses (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2016) (noting allocations based on crop types and water demands). 
 169  Id. See also Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared supra 
note 162 (providing a comprehensive historical context to these rights system); MARTIN, supra 
note 161 (explaining the evolution of these issues in New South Wales).  
 170  WATER MARKETS IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 165. 
 171  Sarah Wheeler et al., Water Trading in Australia: Tracing Its’ Development and Impact 
over the Past Three Decades, in WATER MARKETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 7, at 179.  
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Colorado River Basin and other systems.172 Finally, Amy Sennett and her 
colleagues have described some of the challenges and responses in the 
Murray–Darling Basin from an American perspective.173 
A. Significant Water Reforms in the MurrayDarling Basin Since 1990 
Water management in the MurrayDarling Basin has seen several 
significant reforms in the last two decades, with three reforms of particular 
importance to the success of Australia’s water markets. 
First, in 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) (the 
Federal Government along with State and Territory Governments) adopted 
water resources policy measures that promoted water trade and agreed to 
separate land and water.174 The result was an abandonment of the 
appurtenance doctrine, whereby water rights are tied to a particular tract of 
land and can be moved to another tract of land, if at all, only with great 
difficulty and expense. COAG further advanced this agenda with the 
adoption of a National Water Initiative in 2004.175 
Second, in 1995, a “cap” on diversions of surface water was introduced 
in the MurrayDarling Basin.176 This was an essential step in developing a 
“cap and trade” scheme. With the adoption of the cap, a range of more 
specific decisions were made in each state to deal with issues such as 
underutilized entitlements.177 Generally speaking, all issued entitlements 
within a given class were respected equally regardless of their history of 
use.178 The cap serves as a limit on the average amount of water used, not the 
water allocated (which is generally an amount 20%–30% higher). Underuse 
occurs for a range of reasons, including presence of “sleeper” (unused) and 
“dozer” (partially used) licenses, various risk profiles adopted by water 
users, and unseasonable rainfall suppressing demand.179 To address the risk 
of underutilized allocation causing an increase in use, a range of provisions 
have been introduced, as well as planned frameworks with provisions 
 
 172  R. Quentin Grafton et. al., Comparative Assessment of Water Markets: Insights from the 
MurrayDarling Basin of Australia and the Western USA, 14 WATER POL’Y 175 (2012); see also R. 
Quentin Grafton et. al., Global Insights into Water Resources, Climate Change and Governance, 
3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 315 (2012), (examining extractions in both the Colorado and the 
Murray–Darling river basins).  
 173  Amy Sennett et al., Challenges and Responses in the MurrayDarling Basin, 16 WATER 
POL’Y 117 (2014).  
 174  ENV’T AUSTL., MARINE & WATER DIV., THE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS’ WATER 
REFORM FRAMEWORK 4 (1994), available at https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/ 
resources/6caa5879-8ebc-46ab-8f97-4219b8ffdd98/files/policyframework.pdf. 
 175  INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ON A NATIONAL WATER INITIATIVE 9–11 (2004), available 
at http://www.nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/24749/Intergovernmental-Agreement-on-a-
national-water-initiative.pdf. 
 176  See MURRAYDARLING BASIN COMM’N, THE CAP: PROVIDING SECURITY FOR WATER USERS 
AND SUSTAINABLE RIVERS (2004) available at http://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/archived/ 
cap/cap_brochure_0.pdf. 
 177  MARTIN, supra note 161, at 123–24. 
 178  Id. at 124. 
 179  Id. at 88. 
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designed to operate should the risk materialize, without restricting access 
until such increase occurs.180 
None of this, of course, would be possible in the western United States 
without essentially abandoning the priority system of water rights. Whatever 
its merits, the priority system is unlikely to change.181 In the implementation 
of the cap, the notion of “beneficial use”—so prominent in the prior 
appropriation laws of the western United States182 and a key feature of early 
Australian water law183—was considered irrelevant and entirely abandoned. 
Third, the Australian Government enacted the Water Act 2007.184 This 
law requires the development of a Basin Plan specifying sustainable 
diversion limits throughout the Basin for both surface water and 
groundwater and also other features.185 The Basin Plan was completed in 
2012 and has set limits on water use that will come into effect in 2019.186 
These limits on surface use are approximately 20% lower than 2009 levels 
and are designed to ensure a sustainable future for the Basin.187 
These sustainable diversion limits were possible only because of the 
successful introduction of the cap, and they complement other activities 
designed to recover water for the environment, such as The Living Murray 
Initiative.188 The Basin Plan also provides for uniform water marketing rules 
across the Basin189 and, from 2014, prohibits certain restrictions on water 
marketing such as those that discriminate based on the purpose for which 
 
 180  See id. at 197 (listing several flexible strategies used to avoid inefficiencies). 
 181  Aside from political opposition to such a change, it would be difficult and perhaps 
impossible to overcome legal challenges based upon the “takings” clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 
(1992) (reasoning that regulation that deprives the owner of all value is a per se taking unless 
the regulation is designed to prevent a nuisance); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding that a court should examine the “character” and “economic 
impact” of the regulation, and most importantly whether it interferes with “distinct, investment-
backed expectations”); Casitas Muni. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (finding the water lost by the district was not a loss of any property rights in the water, 
since the district’s property right was limited to beneficial use of the water, and the regulation 
did not reduce deliveries to customers, and thus did not show a loss of beneficial use). 
 182  Davis, supra note 162, at 688. 
 183  Id. at 662 (describing the adoption by New South Wales of “‘beneficial use’ classifications 
for various irrigation diversion licenses” in 1946). 
 184  Water Act 2007 (Austl.), available at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00272/ 
Download (select “download” tab and then select one of the Act Compilation file options—PDF, 
docx, or zip). 
 185  Id. at 42. 
 186  Water Act Basin Plan 2012 (Austl.), at 28, available at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/ 
Details/F2012L02240. 
 187  MurrayDarling Basin Auth., Sustainable Diversion Limits, http://www.mdba.gov.au/ 
sites/default/files/pubs/CSIRO-summary-of-the-scoring-method.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) 
(explaining that the diversion limits in the MurrayDarling Basin will be reduced from the 2009 
level of 13,623 gallons per year to 10,873 gallons per year). 
 188  See MURRAYDARLING BASIN AUTH., THE LIVING MURRAY STORY: ONE OF AUSTRALIA’S 
LARGEST RIVER RESTORATION PROJECTS (2011), available at http://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/ 
default/files/pubs/The-Living-Murray-story.pdf (discussing the Living Murray Initiative). 
 189  Water Act Basin Plan 2012, supra note 186, at 122. 
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the water may be used or the owner of the water.190 Some restrictions are 
also permissible based on considerations such as environmental impacts, 
negative impacts on other users (other than an impact arising solely because 
of an increase in use of the traded water access right), or hydraulic 
connectivity.191 
B. Water Marketing in the MurrayDarling Basin 
In the MurrayDarling Basin, water marketing is an important feature of 
water management with temporary and permanent water traded extensively 
throughout the Basin. For example, in 2011–2012, the amount traded in the 
southern MurrayDarling Basin was 3698 GL (3.0 million acre-feet) on the 
temporary market (10,908 trades) and 719 GL (0.6 million acre-feet) on the 
permanent market (4,709 trades).192 Trade across state borders, which 
commenced in the 1990s, is permitted where systems are connected and is 
included in these figures.193 
Water marketing has provided manifold economic and environmental 
benefits. Economically, it provides for water to move to its highest value use 
and is particularly valuable during periods of drought. In particular, the 
ability to move water quickly between temporary and permanent crops has 
resulted in reduced production losses.194 This has been possible only because 
water rights are largely fungible, and because transaction costs195 and 
processing times for transfers have been minimized.196 In terms of processing 
time, for example, standards introduced in 2009 provide for 90% of 
temporary trades to be approved within five days for intrastate trade and ten 
days for interstate trade throughout most of the MurrayDarling Basin.197 For 
permanent trades the comparable standard is twenty days.198 Recent 
performance suggests these standards are generally met or exceeded.199 
Providing comprehensive information to the market is also a key 
element of the MurrayDarling Basin program. The Basin Plan requires that 
 
 190  Id. at 125. 
 191  Id.  
 192  R. Quentin Grafton & James Horne, Water Markets in the MurrayDarling Basin, 145 
AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 61, 64 (2014). 
 193  Id. at 61–64. 
 194  Wheeler et al., supra note 171, at 179, 196. 
 195  See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960) 
(discussing transaction costs). 
 196  Austl. Gov’t Nat’l Water Mkt., Trade Processing Times—Standards and Performance, 
http://www.nationalwatermarket.gov.au/water-market-reports/trade-processing.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that 90% of temporary trades get processed within 10 days 
throughout most of the basin); AUSTL. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, AUSTRALIAN WATER 
MARKETS REPORT 2010–11 240–54 (2011), available at http://archive.nwc.gov.au/library/ 
topic/markets/australian-water-markets-report-2010-11 (select “Section 5” at bottom of page). 
 197  Id.  
 198  Id.  
 199  AUSTRALIAN WATER MARKETS REPORT 2010–11, supra note 196, at 10. 
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water marketing information be collated and published in a single location.200 
Extensive information about water trading rules and the characteristics of a 
large number of actively traded water access rights is now available 
throughout the Basin on the internet.201 Displaying this information in a 
single location allows for easier comparisons between different types of 
water access rights.202 The price of the sale of water is also now required to 
be made publicly available.203 
C. Water Marketing and Water Efficiency 
In terms of water use efficiency, the advent of water marketing created 
positive incentives for potential sellers by placing a marginal cost on losses 
such as seepage or those arising through inefficient irrigation. This, in turn, 
motivated sellers to ameliorate these losses where cost-effective. The ability 
to sell water has also provided opportunities for water users to raise funds 
to invest in efficient practices on their farms.204 
Recent reforms in the Basin have aimed to reduce the amount of water 
being used for consumptive purposes in order to restore water to the 
environment.205 The implementation of these reforms has utilized water 
markets to achieve their purposes. 
As part of the reforms associated with the Water Act 2007, over AUD 
$13 billion is being invested by the federal government, including AUD $3.2 
billion to recover water through direct market purchase from willing 
sellers.206 A major program in this initiative is the Sustainable Rural Water 
Use and Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP), which is: 
 
 200  MurrayDarling Basin Auth., Basin Plan Water Trading Rules, http://www.mdba.gov.au/ 
managing-water/water-markets-trade/basin-plan-water-trading-rules (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
 201  Id. 
 202  Id. 
 203  MurrayDarling Basin Auth., Fact Sheet: New Basin Plan Water Trading Rules Start 1st 
July 2014, http://www.mdba.gov.au/media-pubs/publications/new-bp-water-trading-rules-start-
1st-july-2014 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 204  MARSDEN JACOB ASSOCS., SURVEY OF WATER ENTITLEMENT SELLERS UNDER THE RESTORING 
THE BALANCE IN THE MURRAYDARLING BASIN PROGRAM 20–28 (2012), available at 
https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/63d24e7b-40bf-41ab-9777-eefc6113c967/ 
files/sellers-survey-report.pdf. Cf. DENNIS WICHELNS, AGRICULTURAL WATER PRICING: UNITED 
STATES 9 (2010) (explaining that farmers can earn money by selling their water rights to others); 
Ilan Brat, California Drought Spurs Technology on the Farm, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/drought-is-the-mother-of-invention-on-the-farm-1437041211 (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2016) (indicating that farmers are increasingly investing in water efficiency 
updates). 
 205  Austl. Dep’t of the Env’t, Restoring the Balance in the Murray-Darling Basin, [hereinafter 
Restoring the Balance] http://www.environment.gov.au/water/rural-water/restoring-balance-
murray-darling-basin (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).  
 206  Austl. Dep’t of the Env’t, Independent Review of the Water Act 2007, 
https://www.environment.gov.au/water/legislation/water-act-review (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) 
(describing implementation of the AUD $13 billion reforms); Restoring the Balance, supra note 
205 (explaining that “the Australian Government has committed $3.2 billion to purchase water 
for the environment”). 
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[I]nvesting in rural water use, management, and efficiency, including improved 
water knowledge and market reform, and water purchase for the environment. 
It is the key mechanism to “bridge the gap” to the sustainable diversion limits 
under the MurrayDarling Basin Plan and consists of three main components: 
irrigation infrastructure projects, water purchase and supply measures. 
The majority of SRWUIP infrastructure funds are committed to projects in the 
Murray–Darling Basin for improving the operation of off-farm delivery systems 
and helping irrigators improve on-farm water use efficiency. The water savings 
generated from these projects are shared between the Australian Government 
for environmental use, and irrigators for consumptive use.207 
Through part of SRWUIP known as “Restoring the Balance in the 
Murray–Darling Basin program, the Australian Government has committed 
[AUD] $3.2 billion to purchase water for the environment.”208 Water buybacks 
obtain water for the environment from irrigators who wish to offer their 
water entitlement for sale.209 Any water saved through efficiency savings 
such as those realized under this program, or through any other process, is 
fully tradable.210 
D. Lessons Learned 
Among the key lessons from the Australian experience is the 
importance of separating land and water titles and defining water 
entitlements in terms that facilitate trading so they are fungible within a 
particular basin or geographic region.211 Defining all entitlements on a 
volumetric basis is an essential first step in such a process. With the 
exception of stored water systems, this condition does not apply in the 
western United States,212 which makes it harder to treat water as a fungible 
commodity. Ongoing efforts to minimize transaction costs, which discourage 
trading, also characterize the Australian water trading experience.213 
 
 207  Austl. Dep’t of the Env’t, Rural Water, (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) http://www. 
environment.gov.au/topics/water/rural-water. 
 208  Restoring the Balance, supra note 205. 
 209  See Austl. Dep’t of the Env’t, Progress of Water Recovery Under the Restoring the 
Balance in the Murray-Darling Basin Program, http://www.environment.gov.au/water/rural-
water/restoring-balance-murray-darling-basin/progress-water-recovery (last visited Feb. 13, 
2016) (discussing the environmental benefits of the “Restoring the Balance in the Murray–
Darling Basin Program” and cataloging the water purchases secured as of November 2015). 
 210  Water Act Basin Plan 2012, supra note 186. Specifically, the right to trade entitlements is 
free of restrictions based on class of person (clause 12.07) and purpose for which water is used 
(clause 12.08), and these apply to entitlements held and used for environmental purposes. Id. 
Some environmental holders are subject to conditions on the tradability of entitlements held as 
part of their establishing provisions but the market itself does not restrict such trades.  
 211  YOUNG, supra note 7, at 12. 
 212  Roderick E. Walston, Western Water Law, 1 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 6, 6 (1986) (explaining that 
water rights in the western United States are based on “actual need and use,” rather than being 
defined volumetrically). 
 213  See, e.g., RAY CHALLEN, INSTITUTIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM FOR WATER RESOURCES 75–76 (2000) (explaining that the institutional 
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Transaction costs have frequently been identified as major reasons that 
United States water markets have failed to result in robust trading.214 
In their thorough examination of water markets in the MurrayDarling 
Basin, Grafton and Horne identified several key lessons including: 
 Water markets support regional resilience 
 Capping extractions promotes effective use and sustainability 
 Reliable, accessible, and timely market information promotes 
effective decision making 
 Markets can promote environmental outcomes 
 Acquiring water for the environment through buybacks has proved 
effective 
 Prices contain information on scarcity and risk 
 Basin-wide and local perspectives have roles to play 
 Effective monitoring and control of extractions are critical for 
sustainability.215 
 
The development of water markets in the MurrayDarling Basin is an 
example of settling on a decision to introduce markets for their attendant 
benefits and then dedicate effort to addressing the issues that arise in order 
to bring the market to fruition. These water markets have also proved to be 
an effective tool for managing competing demands of agricultural and 
environmental uses. An alternative approach based on working through all 
policy problems before committing to water markets would have been less 
likely to have been successful. In other words, the Australian experience 
suggests that western states might consider the desirability of pressing 
forward with new water marketing programs without worrying that every 
conceivable problem has not been solved. The problems will be identified 
with experience and can then be addressed as needed. Moreover, the risks 
associated with moving forward can be greatly minimized by focusing on 
markets that have the greatest potential for success. Using this standard, this 
Article suggests that a focus, at least initially, on markets for conserved 
water might make sense. Moreover, states can use pilot programs to test the 
 
structure of the MurrayDarling Basin water market is partially explained by a desire to reduce 
transaction costs); Lin Crase et al., Towards an Understanding of Static Transaction Costs in the 
NSW Permanent Water Market: An Application of Choice Modelling (Jan. 2001) (Paper 
presented at the 45th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Society), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/125588/2/Crase.pdf 
(discussing a conceptual model for pricing water entitlements that accounts for transaction 
costs). 
 214  See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 
81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 704–05 (1993) (indicating that “high cost of statutory transfer proceedings, 
however, almost certainly deters many transfers”). 
 215  Grafton & Horne, supra note 192, at 67–69. 
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potential for new water marketing schemes, thereby minimizing the 
consequences for any unsuccessful marketing programs. 
V. SOLVING THE TECHNICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH WATER MARKETS 
Without some sort of national program for promoting water markets, 
such as Australia adopted for the MurrayDarling Basin, solving the 
technical and legal problems with water marketing—even in the somewhat 
narrow category of conserved water—will prove challenging. Since a 
national solution is almost impossible to imagine in the western United 
States, where local control over water resources is a nonnegotiable 
condition of water policy, tackling the more nuanced problems with water 
markets under the current technical and legal regime is the only realistic 
path forward. 
Perhaps the ever-threatening crisis facing water managers around the 
West will help push policymakers in a reform direction. California, in 
particular, which faces what are perhaps the most serious water problems in 
recent memory,216 seems prepared to consider any reasonable reform 
measures. Indeed, California appears to be the only state that currently 
recognizes the value of establishing a market for conserved water as 
evidenced by its adoption of laws that expressly allow transfers of 
conserved water.217 Yet notwithstanding California’s efforts, a robust water 
market for conserved water has yet to emerge in that state. So, what more 
can be done? 
First, unlike in Australia’s MurrayDarling Basin, water rights in the 
western United States are not defined in terms of a fungible property right.218 
But a fungible right in conserved water is possible if states can develop and 
implement simple yet accurate methods for measuring and verifying water 
savings that can gain the confidence of all potentially affected parties. 
Second, states must restructure their water management institutions to 
accommodate a robust marketing program as was done in the 
MurrayDarling Basin. Finally, the current water transfer laws must be 
transformed so that they no longer pose a serious obstacle to sensible water 
marketing programs. While wholesale reforms such as those used in the 
MurrayDarling Basin are politically impractical, more modest reforms 
focused on conserved water could nonetheless lead to a substantial water 
marketing program. None of this will be easy. The following offers some 
 
 216  See CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S MOST SIGNIFICANT DROUGHTS: COMPARING 
HISTORICAL AND RECENT CONDITIONS i (2015), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/water 
conditions/docs/DWR_DroughtBroch_070815-web.pdf (providing that the period between 2012 
and 2014 set several climate records, including being the driest three year period of statewide 
precipitation on record). 
 217  See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. 
 218  William A. Wilcox, Jr. & David Stanton, Maintaining Federal Water Rights in the Western 
United States, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1996, 3 (discussing western state water law’s focus on priority in 
time stemming from mining law principles). 
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initial ideas for reforming current law and making conserved water markets 
a reality. 
A. Establish Markets for Conserved Water 
While the Australian experience shows the value of moving forward 
with a marketing program, even before every problem is fully addressed, a 
headlong rush into a water marketing program without first defining the 
basic parameters and structure of a program would be foolish. Set forth 
below is a review of the three key steps that will have to be taken to 
establish a marketing program for conserved water. These include: 
1) identifying basins with a high potential for water conservation and a 
high demand for additional water resources; 
2) measuring the amount of water saved by water conservation 
methods appropriate to those basins; and 
3) establishing an appropriate institutional framework for managing a 
conserved water transfer program. 
This last step is especially important and receives extended treatment in this 
Section. 
1. Targeting Basins for Conserved Water Marketing Programs 
While a broad-scale program for marketing conserved water could be 
adopted, states should focus their initial efforts on identifying water basins 
with a high potential for both water conservation, as narrowly defined in this 
Article, and water demand. The Front Range of Colorado, with its growing 
population and strong farming traditions, might be a good candidate. The 
pecan growing regions of New Mexico in the Rio Grande Basin and the 
almond and pistachio farms of central California suggest other areas with 
high potential for conserved water markets. 
Any legislation adopted to facilitate the program should articulate a 
policy of rolling out the program slowly and focusing, at least initially, on 
high potential areas. The legislation might also incorporate an adaptive 
management scheme219 that provides the implementing agency with the 
flexibility needed to improve the program based upon the experience gained 
from early implementation. 
2. Measuring and Verifying Water Savings 
In some ways, this should be the simplest problem to solve. While much 
new research will likely be needed, especially to expand conserved water 
programs to include deficit irrigation, sufficient information is already 
available to implement conserved water programs. For instance, we know 
enough about evapotranspiration rates for many crops in many soil types to 
 
 219  For a discussion of adaptive management, see infra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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be able to estimate with good accuracy the amount of consumptive water 
savings from crop switching.220 We know, for example that shifting ten acres 
from alfalfa to sorghum in the lower Colorado River Basin is likely to yield 
something on the order of nineteen acre-feet of conserved water.221 Some 
standard adjustment may have to be made to account for uncertainty. To 
address the problem of uncertainty and reassure existing water users, states 
might set a policy of reducing the amount available for conserved water 
transfers by 10% to account for uncertainty and to protect natural stream 
flows. But what cannot be allowed is an extensive process for challenging a 
scientifically-based administrative decision that has documented the extent 
of water savings to be expected through the application of particular 
conserved water practices in particular basins.222 These numbers will need to 
be settled for a designated trading basin if a market is going to emerge. But, 
as suggested above, states can target particular basins with high potential 
for agricultural-to-urban water transfers, which should serve to stimulate 
any necessary research and help the agency design pilot projects. 
Likewise, water savings from rotational fallowing can be fairly readily 
ascertained. Since fallowing typically involves leaving a specific percentage 
of land uncultivated,223 the water user can be required to reduce diversions 
by that same percentage, allowing for the transfer of the consumptive 
portion of the water right that was not diverted. Once again, however, 
perfect certainty cannot be expected and should not be required. 
Because deficit irrigation takes many forms, it is somewhat harder to 
generalize about the accuracy of water savings claims. Some types of DI can 
surely be measured with great accuracy, such as proposals to forego a 
second, third, or fourth cutting of alfalfa.224 More sophisticated, RDI 
techniques that involve changes to the timing of water applications may 
prove harder to measure, and special attention will be needed to train 
regulators as to how they can verify the extent of water savings. Once again, 
however, research efforts can be targeted to trading basins that hold the 
prospect of significant water savings and high water resources demand. 
Of course, establishing trading basins for conserved water where water 
can be easily bought and sold is only the first step. Before conserved water 
marketing can become a reality, changes to both the institutional 
 
 220  See, e.g., TIMOTHY K. GATES ET AL., IRRIGATION PRACTICES, WATER CONSUMPTION, & RETURN 
FLOWS IN COLORADO’S LOWER ARKANSAS RIVER VALLEY (2012) (analyzing evapotranspiration for 
various crops in the Lower Arkansas River Valley). 
 221  COHEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 64 (noting a rate of 1.9 acre-feet saved per acre 
converted). 
 222  One of the great mysteries of the prior appropriation system is why the system is so rigid 
with respect to water transfers when it is so tolerant about uncertainties that exist in other 
parts of the water administration system. See generally Mark Squillace, Accounting for Water 
Rights in the Western United States, in WATER ACCOUNTING: INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING 270 (Jayne M. Godfrey & Keryn Chalmers eds., 2011) (suggesting 
improvements in the regulatory system for managing water rights).  
 223  See supra Part II.C. 
 224  See supra Part II.A.1. 
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frameworks used to manage water resources and to the laws that govern 
water use will be needed. These issues are addressed more fully below. 
3. Establishing an Institutional Framework for Managing Conserved Water 
Transfers 
Every western state has a developed comprehensive system for 
managing its water resources. With the exception of Colorado, all of these 
states rely almost entirely on administrative agencies to manage their water 
resources.225 Colorado is unique in setting up a system of water courts, water 
judges, and water magistrates226 that are largely responsible for managing 
surface water rights.227 All of these western states, however, take a similar 
approach to processing and approving water transfers—a term generally 
defined broadly to include a change of use, change of place of use, and 
change of point of diversion.228 And the restriction on transfers that is most 
common among these states is the requirement that the applicant 
demonstrate “no injury” to existing water users.229 
The no injury requirement has proved a formidable obstacle to water 
transfers. Injury can be demonstrated in many ways, but as a general rule 
 
 225  See GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR., CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO COLORADO WATER LAW 12 (2004), available 
at http://www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages/geog_4501_s14/readings/CG-
Law2004.pdf (explaining that Colorado is the only western state that uses courts instead of an 
administrative permitting system to determine water rights). 
 226  MARILYN C. O’LEARY, UTTON TRANSBOUNDARY RES. CTR., AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLORADO 
WATER COURT SYSTEM 7–9 (2003), available at http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Colorado_ 
Water_Courts.pdf (describing the structure of Colorado’s water court system). 
 227  The management regime for groundwater in Colorado is complex. Most groundwater is 
deemed “tributary” to surface water and unless exceptions apply, is managed by the water 
courts as part of the surface water system. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-103(10.5) (West 
2015) (defining “nontributary groundwater” as water that would not deplete the flows of a 
surface stream by 0.1% if withdrawn over 100 years); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 
977 (Colo. 1951) (“Under our Colorado law, it is the presumption that all ground water so 
situated finds its way to the stream in the watershed of which it lies, is tributary thereto, and 
subject to appropriation as part of the waters of the stream.” (citing DeHaas v. Benesch, 181 
P.2d 453, 456 (1947))).  
 228  But see Thayer v. Rawlins, 594 P.2d. 951, 955–56 (Wyo. 1979) (holding that a change in 
the point of discharge does not generally require state approval). Note, however, that point of 
discharge changes can have serious negative consequences for existing water users. See id. at 
952 (approving a new city water system in which effluent discharges previously used by 
defendants for irrigation would now be discharged downstream and thus unavailable).  
 229  See THOMPSON, JR. ET. AL., supra note 151, at 313 (“Procedurally, a water right holder who 
wishes to change the point of diversion or the type, place, or time of use has the burden of 
presenting at least a prima facie case that the change will not injure junior appropriators. In 
most states, the burden of proof then shifts to any protesters to refute the evidence and 
demonstrate that the proposed change would injure them.” (citations omitted)); Danielson v. 
Kerbs AG., Inc., 646 P.2d 363, 374 (Colo. 1982) (“The burden of proof to establish that a change 
of use will not injure the rights of other users from the same source rests upon the person 
seeking the change.”); Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 
799, 811 (Colo. 2001) (stating that after an applicant meets their initial burden, the objectors 
have the burden of proving injury); CF & I Steel Corp. v. Rooks, 495 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Colo. 1972) 
(noting that once petitioner made a prima facie case in support of the change, “[i]t was then the 
responsibility of the protestants to show the injury resulting to them”). 
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most states have determined that transfers should be limited to the amount 
of water consumed by the transferor’s historic use,230 presumably on the 
theory that maintaining consumptive use is less likely to injure third parties. 
But injuries can occur even where the transferee does not propose to 
increase consumptive use, such as where the transfer changes the timing of 
return flows to the original stream.231 And the law generally makes no 
provision even for relatively minor injuries.232 An important consequence of 
this fact is that opponents of a proposed transfer are quite often in a strong 
position to make credible objections. Overcoming those objections takes 
time and costs money. Lawyers representing both sides often hire experts 
and the experts frequently offer conflicting views about the potential 
consequences of a transfer.233 With no certainty about when, if ever, a 
proposed transfer might be approved, about the amount of water that might 
ultimately be approved for transfer, or about the ultimate financial cost of 
consummating a transfer, parties seeking municipal water supplies and 
others seeking access to new water supplies are understandably reluctant to 
rely on such transfers to secure the water they need. 
Streamlining the transfer process will require some legislative changes 
or clarifications as described below. But it will also require some 
institutional changes. It seems highly unlikely that western states in the 
United States will be able to match Australia’s success in approving 
temporary transfers within five days and permanent transfers within twenty 
days. However, substantial progress is possible. Set forth below are several 
institutional reforms that would move the states in the right direction toward 
achieving the critical goal of timely review and approval of water transfers. 
 
 230  THOMPSON, ET AL., supra note 151, at 330 (“[M]ost states provide that water sellers can 
transfer only the water that they have historically been using.”); See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail 
Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 56–57 (Colo. 1999) (finding that a change 
in water right must be limited to the amount historically withdrawn for that right); Weibert v. 
Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371–72 (Colo. 1980) (“The right to change a point of diversion 
or place of use is also limited in quantity and time by historical use.”); Basin Elec. Power Coop. 
v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d. 557, 566 (Wyo. 1978) (holding that a purchaser could not 
consume more water than a seller had historically consumed, even in the absence of injury to 
junior appropriators (citing WYO. STAT. ANN § 41-3-104 (1977) (“[C]hange in use, or change in 
place of use, may be allowed, provided that the quantity of water transferred by the granting of 
the petition shall not exceed the amount of water historically diverted under the existing use . . . 
nor increase the historic amount consumptively used under the existing use, nor decrease the 
historic amount of return flow, nor in any manner injure other existing lawful appropriators.”)). 
 231  See Draft Water Transfer Guide, supra note 154, at 3-8 (pointing out that an agricultural 
user in California can recapture and reuse water and thereby cause downstream users injury 
even though that same user cannot transfer the recaptured water even if the injury to the 
downstream user would be the same). 
 232  See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 307 (summarizing the “no injury” rule). 
 233  Mark Squillace, Water Transfers for a Changing Climate, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55, 60–61 
(2013). 
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a. Establish a Simple, Predictable, and Transparent Administrative 
Process for Making Conserved Water Determinations 
In order for a robust market in conserved water transfers to flourish, all 
affected parties will have to understand how it works and what will be the 
likely outcome of any application. Put another way, the system will have to 
follow a well-understood and predictable formula for determining the 
amount of water that can be marketed. So, for example, farmers who 
propose to switch from alfalfa to soybeans in a particular transfer basin will 
need to know how much conserved water per acre they can expect to make 
available for sale. Prospective buyers and other potentially affected parties 
will also benefit from such predictability. 
For this to work efficiently, an administrative agency charged with 
approving conserved water transfers must be identified and empowered to 
make the critical decisions. The process might then proceed as follows:   
First, the agency can identify one or more basins where a high potential 
for conserved water transfers exist. These will likely be rural areas with 
substantial acreage planted in high water consumption crops like alfalfa 
along water systems that are easily accessible by prospective buyers, most 
likely urban water utilities. Once conserved water transfer basins are 
designated, the agency can then set about determining the extent of 
consumptive use for the dominant crops in the basin, based upon crop, 
climate, and soils. Ideally, peer-reviewed studies will already be available to 
document such use, but, if not, the agency might commission research 
universities to carry out such studies. 
The delineation of water transfer basins and determinations about the 
consumptive use of various crops within the basin should be developed 
through a traditional notice and comment rulemaking process.234 An 
administrative appeal and limited judicial review of any decision under this 
first step might be appropriate, but the standard of review should be highly 
deferential to the agencyas it usually is with agency rulemaking 
proceedings235especially if the agency commits to an adaptive management 
scheme going forward as proposed below. 
Second, the agency could invite applications from interested farmers to 
have their water rights quantified in terms of consumptive use. As suggested 
above, for this to work efficiently, the determination will have to be largely 
formulaic. The farmer will have to demonstrate the number of acres 
historically farmed for particular crops and the agency will then use the 
 
 234  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-103 (2013); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-8-4 (2005).  
 235  See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle 
of deference to administrative interpretations.”). Consumptive use calculations can be made 
through a rulemaking or legislative-type process, allowing an opportunity for public comment 
and review. The agency should be accorded wide discretion to make a reasoned choice based 
upon evidence in the record; once that decision is made, the agency should be allowed to apply 
it in the field. 
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consumptive use numbers for those crops in that basin to calculate the 
farmer’s consumptive use right. This calculation will form the baseline 
against which conserved water transfers might be measured. So long as the 
agency uses the formula devised during the first step there should be no 
basis for appeals or further review. 
Third, the agency will entertain an application from the farmer to 
transfer conserved water based upon a plan to switch crops, fallow land, or 
engage in some form of measurable DI scheme. A modest reduction of 
perhaps 10% of the calculated conserved water amount might be assessed to 
account for possible uncertainties associated with the calculations. This 
would have the ancillary benefit of protecting natural stream flows. As with 
the initial calculation of consumptive use, the agency will have to determine 
the new consumptive use based upon research data and field experience, 
and, like that original determination, additional research might be needed to 
make the initial judgments about conserved water savings. 
To be clear, basin-wide decisions about the consumptive use of 
particular crops in particular transfer basins should be made through notice 
and comment rulemaking proceedings, subject to the same limited appeal 
rights as might be available for the initial consumptive use determinations. 
Once these decisions are made, however, the agency should be free to use a 
formula to calculate the conserved water savings. 
Farmers who are interested in marketing conserved water will likely 
gravitate toward conserved water strategies for which accurate 
measurements are available and clear rules have been established. Over 
time, however, new research and information from past conserved water 
transfers will allow for refinement of the data and the employment of other 
strategies. 
Finally, the agency will need to establish a monitoring and verification 
process to ensure that farmers who transfer conserved water follow through 
with their plans. While much of this might be accomplished with self-
reporting, modern drone technologies or infrared photography might offer 
an efficient means for agencies to oversee and verify at least some of the 
activities promised by the transferors.236 
As part of the approval process, agencies might also commit farmers to 
cooperating with researchers who can improve the data on consumptive use 
following the conserved water transfer, and farmers might be asked to 
commit to an adaptive management scheme237 whereby conserved water 
 
 236  See, e.g., Doering, supra note 141 (outlining the future agricultural market for drones); 
Johnson & Hermann, supra note 143 (describing the high accuracy and increasing availability of 
agricultural drones).  
 237  The theory of adaptive management traces to a 1978 book written by C.S. “Buzz” Hollings 
and several colleagues. C.S. HOLLINGS ET AL., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT (1978). The authors of this book criticize the traditional environmental impact 
assessment process because it fails to account for the dynamic nature of ecosystems. Id. at 7. 
The adaptive process that they outline responds to this problem by emphasizing a constant 
cycle of: 1) collecting information; 2) establishing metrics to evaluate resource conditions; 3) 
monitoring resources to measure management success; and 4) adapting management to reflect 
the new information that emerges from this process. Id. at 55. Since the time of the Hollings 
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calculations might be adjusted up or down to reflect new information 
obtained during the monitoring process. Figure 1 roughly illustrates the 


















The notice and comment rulemaking proceedings will take a minimum 
of several months but once the rules are final, transfers themselves should 
proceed fairly quickly. While it seems highly unlikely that all of the post- 
rulemaking steps can be completed in less than five days for temporary 
transfers and twenty days for permanent transfers as they are in Australia, 
temporary transfers in particular ought not to take much longer. Once the 
kinks in the system are worked out and the necessary data becomes 
available, there is no reason why temporary transfers should take more than 
fifteen to twenty days. 
b. Establish a Transparent Administrative Process and a Water 
Exchange Where Conserved Water Can Be Bought and Sold 
Australia has been successful in part because of its commitment to 
transparency. Price and water security information about individual 
transactions is available online.238 If western states hope to find similar 
success with water markets, they will likely have to commit themselves to a 
similar level of transparency. 
In some ways, the commitment to transparency should not be difficult 
if the more robust form of water marketing proposed here is limited to 
conserved water transfers. One could imagine, for example, that a conserved 
 
book, adaptive management has become a popular initiative, especially for land management 
agencies. See, e.g., GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS, 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf (“The concept of adaptive management has 
gained attention as a means of linking learning with policy and implementation.”). 
 238  Restoring the Balance, supra note 205. 
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water right in a hypothetical Muddy Creek Conserved Water Transfer Basin 
for ten acre-feet, with a priority date of 1900, could be listed for sale at a 
specified price once the state agency had approved a conserved water plan 
for the applicant.239 Other potential buyers and sellers will be able to see the 
listing and decide on an appropriate offer and purchase price as the market 
develops. Before long the website should function effectively as a public 
water exchange, which is essentially how the Australia system operates.240 If 
prices are sufficiently high, other farmers will respond by submitting 
conserved water plans and making more water available. 
As part of the exchange, states might establish an efficient system for 
buying and selling rights online, or they might simply offer the exchange as a 
place to record private transactions. In the interests of transparency, 
however, states must insist that all transactions be recorded and that the 
purchase price for the water rights be included in the records. Without this 
critical information, the market cannot be expected to function efficiently 
and, since the water itself is universally understood to be the property of the 
state,241 demanding price information as a condition on the sale of the state’s 
water should not raise legal objections. 
c. Focus on Temporary Transfers 
The Australian water market is designed to work with both temporary 
and permanent water rights, although a substantial majority of the transfers 
occur on the temporary market.242 As used in this Article, and as defined 
under the Australian system, a temporary transfer is one that lasts for one 
 
 239  Western United States water rights will be identified (and to some extent valued) based 
upon their priority date. Australia does not use priority dates but lists water rights on its 
website in terms of its level of security, or the chance it will actually be available for use. See, 
e.g., Austl. Dep’t of the Env’t, Average Prices of Offers Pursued from Recent Tenders, 
http://www.environment.gov.au/water/rural-water/restoring-balance-murray-darling-basin/ 
average-prices-offers (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (noting that a water right with “low reliability” 
is less secure and therefore commands a much lower price). 
 240  See WATER MARKETS IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 165, at 11 (describing the trading 
platforms, which rely on publicly available information). Australia has several water exchanges 
associated with large irrigation network schemes and some private owners, which provide a 
place for sellers and buyers to meet. See, e.g., Waterfind Australia, About, 
http://www.waterfind.com.au/about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (providing that the Waterfind 
online trading platform has been used by over 11,000 customers); Ruralco Water, 
http://www.ruralcowater.com.au/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (providing information about 
Ruralco Water, a water brokering firm). 
 241  At least since the Institutes of Justinian in 533 A.D., water has been understood as a 
common resource with public rights in the rivers and seas. J. INST. 2.1.1. (Thomas Collett 
Sandars trans., 1922). More explicitly, all states in the western United States expressly devote 
constitutional language to declaring water to be the property of the state. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. 
art. 16 § 5 (“The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of 
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public . . . .”); WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1 
(“The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes, or other collections of still water, within the 
boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be property of the state.”). 
 242  See Grafton & Horne, supra note 192, at 64 tbl.1 (showing that there were 10,908 
allocation trades in 2011–2012, while there were only 4,709 entitlement trades during the same 
period).  
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year or less.243 For agricultural water rights, it might be understood even 
more narrowly as a “seasonal” right, valid only during the irrigation season. 
Urban water utilities in the western United States might understandably 
feel wary about relying on a temporary water market that they fairly 
perceive as being less secure. But their concerns about the temporary 
market are more reflective of the historic absence of a healthy market for 
temporary water rights, rather than legitimate concerns about the 
availability of water. If a robust temporary water market were to develop, 
buyers would begin to feel far more secure about their ability to get water in 
water short years when and where they need it. Presumably the price of 
water would rise with scarcity, but it is unlikely that prices would rise to the 
point where expensive infrastructure projects will look more attractive to 
municipal suppliers. This is because the supply of water potentially available 
from irrigated agriculture is so substantial, as documented earlier in this 
Article.244 
These arguments alone might not provide a sufficient basis for focusing 
on a temporary transfer program to address critical water needs. But a 
powerful case for temporary transfers can be made because of their 
economic and social advantages. Unlike permanent transfers, temporary 
transfers can be far more easily abandoned. If a temporary transfer does not 
yield sufficient compensation for the farmer, or if the residual farming 
activities are not sufficient to overcome the loss that results from the 
temporary sale, the farmer can choose to forego the transfer in future years. 
Moreover, given the uncertainty that might attend some judgments about the 
scope of conserved water rights, and the impacts on third parties when they 
are transferred, a temporary transfer model allows for adjustments. Indeed, 
if a monitoring and adaptive management program is demanded by the 
regulatory agency as a condition for approving the transfer, appropriate 
refinements will be built into the system. All of this seems far more likely to 
gain the acceptance, and perhaps even the support, of the agricultural 
community than a program for the permanent transfer of conserved water. 
If a temporary water market can be established successfully and 
demonstrated to work efficiently, with minimal adverse impacts on the 
agricultural community, then the program might be more easily extended to 
include permanent transfers. But it seems unnecessary to engage in what 
might rightly be perceived as overreaching at the outset of such an 
important program. 
As with other aspects of transfer law, California appears to be the 
farthest along among western states in encouraging temporary transfers. 
The California Water Code expressly provides for expedited processing of 
 
 243  Id. at 62 (explaining that allocation trades involve specified volumes “assigned to a water 
entitlement over a water year”). See also MurrayDarling Basin Auth., Glossary, 
http://www.mdba.gov.au/media-pubs/publications/wam-report-2010-11/wam-web-2010-11/ 
glossary (last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (defining “temporary transfer” to mean “water entitlements 
transferred on an annual basis”).  
 244  See supra Part II. 
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short-term (less than one year) water transfers.245 Under section 1725 of the 
California Water Code, a water rights holder can temporarily transfer their 
rights “if the transfer would only involve the amount of water that would 
have been consumptively used . . . in the absence of the proposed temporary 
change.”246 Such transfers are also exempt from compliance with the 
environmental review process of the California Environmental Quality Act.247 
The law, however, retains a basic no injury standard that includes possible 
adverse impacts on fish and wildlife,248 and this could make temporary 
transfers difficult to consummate. Section 1435 does allow the State Water 
Resources Control Board to issue a temporary transfer without complying 
with the normal transfer procedures where there is an “urgent need” for the 
water,249 but even here, the Board must still make no injury findings along 
with a finding that the transfer is in the public interest.250 
d. Promote Dry-Year Options for Conserved Water 
To address the security concerns of urban suppliers, especially in the 
short-term as markets are becoming established, states should expand and 
liberalize programs for dry-year options by making them easier to arrange 
with conserved water. A dry-year option is essentially an agreement between 
a farmer and a city water supplier that guarantees to the city the right to use 
the water during a dry year as that term is defined in the agreement.251 
Historically, dry-year options have given cities the option of using an entire 
agricultural water right during the dry year.252 To minimize the risk that a 
cyclical drought would take land out of production during multiple years 
over a relatively short period of time, dry-year options have sometimes been 
 
 245  CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1425, 1725 (West 2009) (providing for temporary transfers); Id. 
§ 1728 (defining temporary changes as those involving a transfer for a period of one year or 
less). 
 246  Id. § 1725. 
 247  Draft Water Transfer Guide, supra note 154, at 6-1.  
 248  Id. at 3-7 to 3-8.  
 249  Id. at 6-11.  
 250  Id. The State Water Resources Control Board clearly takes its mandate to expedite short-
term transfers seriously. As it notes in the guide:  
The SWRCB gives the processing of short-term transfers its highest priority . . . . The key 
for rapid action by the SWRCB has been the development and disclosure of the likely 
impacts of the proposed transfer on other legal users of water and to fish and 
wildlife . . . . In 1997 and 1998 the average time to approve a water transfer was less than 
two months. [But] in some cases in the past the approval was achieved within hours of 
receiving the formal request. 
Id. at 6-1. Despite these substantial efforts, anything even close to an average processing time of 
two months is still far too long for a viable temporary transfer program. 
 251  ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., WATER AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: POLICIES TO 
NAVIGATE UNCHARTED WATERS 92 (2013). 
 252  Bonnie G. Colby, Structuring Voluntary Dry Year Transfers, N.M. WATER RES. RESEARCH 
INST., Oct. 2005, at 152, available at http://www.wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/watcon/proc50/colby.pdf 
(explaining that dry-year options allow buyer to “pay an up-front fee which secures the option 
to transfer irrigation water to a new use if specified dry-year conditions are met”). 
6_TOJCI.SQUILLACE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  12:48 PM 
42 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 46:1 
limited so that they cannot be exercised too frequently.253 But this 
undermines the security that the purchaser of the option so desperately 
seeks. 
With transfers of conserved water, farmers are still farming even while 
they are making water available for other uses by consuming less. So, the 
concerns that have led to problematic limits on dry-year option contracts 
would appear to be unnecessary if the options are used to transfer 
conserved water rather than the water right wholesale. 
B. Empower an Agency to Promote Conserved Water Transfers 
As previously discussed, California has come a long way toward setting 
out a program for conserved water transfers.254 But California has yet to 
realize the potential for such transfers to address its water needs. Legislation 
that articulates a policy that: 1) supports and promotes conserved water 
transfers; 2) empowers a specific agency to implement that policy; 3) 
outlines a simple and transparent program for conserved water transfers; 
and 4) is designed to avoid significant legal challenges when such transfers 
are approved, could go a long way towards invigorating a conserved water 
transfer program. Some suggested details for such a program are outlined in 
the previous Section of this Article.255 But the details of the program should 
largely be left to the agency that is charged with managing it. This is critical 
to ensuring that the agency has sufficient flexibility to adapt the program as 
may be warranted based upon the experience gained from the successes and 
failures that are inevitable during the early stages of an ambitious new water 
transfer regime such as proposed here. 
C. Reinterpret the No Injury Rule 
One of the hallmarks of water transfer law in prior appropriation states 
is the no injury rule. It essentially holds that transfers may be approved only 
if they can be accomplished without harming existing appropriators.256 While 
the laws themselves tend not to define injury, the cases that have considered 
the matter appear to take a somewhat absolutist view that existing 
appropriators are protected against any injury.257 Given the myriad ways that 
 
 253  For example, Colorado’s “interruptible supply agreements” cannot be exercised more 
than three years in any ten-year span, and then cannot be approved for another ten-year period 
after that. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-309(3)(c) (2013). 
 254  See supra notes 154–157 and accompanying text.  
 255  See supra Part V.A. 
 256  THOMPSON, supra note 151, at 180 (“[A] kind of blackletter principle of prior 
appropriation law is that an appropriator cannot transfer or change a water right in a way that 
injures another appropriator on the stream.”). 
 257  See, e.g., Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 197 
(Colo. 1999) (“When a petition for a change in use or point of diversion is filed, junior 
appropriators are given the opportunity to object to the change on the grounds that it will 
encroach upon their vested water rights.”); Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc. v. Town of 
Twisp, 947 P.2d 732, 737 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (“Washington’s statute is consistent with the 
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existing appropriators might be affected or harmed without consequence by 
the activities of other water users, including, for example, crop switching to 
higher consumptive crops,258 recapturing and reusing water before it leaves 
one’s property,259 and diverting water in excess of a right due to the limited 
accuracy of measuring devices,260 the strict view of injury in the water 
transfer context is perplexing. But wholesale change of the notion of injury 
in the water transfer context is unnecessary. All that is needed is the 
recognition that de minimis injuries, including injuries that result from 
changes in the timing of return flows, should not give rise to a claim or cause 
of action against the proponent of the transfer. Indeed, changes in the timing 
of return flows can result from changes in irrigation practices that are 
plainly not actionable, such as shifting from furrow irrigation to sprinklers.261 
Thus, if states are serious about the importance of using water transfers to 
meet future water needs, then they must find ways to minimize the 
transaction costs associated with such transfers. Introducing greater 
flexibility into the meaning of injury in the transfer context would be an 
important and welcome beginning. 
D. Shift the Burden of Proof to the Party Claiming Injury 
In most western states, the burden of proving that no one will be 
injured as a result of a transfer is on the applicant.262 The applicant is thus 
 
principle of Western water law that the diversion point of a water right put to beneficial use 
may be granted unless that change causes harm to other water rights.”).  
 258  THOMPSON, supra note 151, at 180 (“[S]enior appropriators should be rewarded for their 
entrepreneurship with unfettered ability to make changes in how they exercise their prior 
appropriation rights,” including “low-value economic uses and relatively inefficient methods of 
use, such as growing alfalfa.”). See also In re Water Rights in Silvies River, 237 P. 322, 327 (Or. 
1925) (considering a change in land use from pasturing to more consumptive hay, the court 
found that “[i]t does not appear to have been the intention of the company to relinquish its 
rights to the use of these waters, but rather to delay or partly suspend the application of the 
waters to a beneficial use”); McPhee v. Kelsey, 74 P. 401, 404 (Or. 1903) (considering ditch 
rights that became contested after both plaintiffs and defendants switched to alfalfa, the court 
found no intent from the outset of the agreement to grow alfalfa).  
 259  Cleaver v. Judd, 393 P.2d 193, 195 n.4 (Or. 1964) (“It has been recognized in Oregon that 
an appropriator is justified in recapturing waste water remaining on his own land.”); Bower v. 
Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (Wyo. 1957) (finding that an appropriator of seepage 
from another’s land “takes his chances that the supply will be kept up; that he has no right 
thereto, no matter how long he may have used it”). 
 260  See Squillace, supra note 222, at 271 (noting how errors due to inaccurate measurement 
tend to result in higher diversions due to incentives).  
 261  See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Montana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation Water Use 
Efficiency and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 265, 288, 293 (2012) 
(noting how the increased efficiency resulting from replacing furrow irrigation with sprinklers 
has caused courts to be “very supportive when appropriators have themselves made such 
improvements”). 
 262  See, e.g., Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 811–
12 (Colo. 2001) (“[T]he applicant for a change of water right . . . bears the initial burden of 
establishing the absence of injurious results from the proposed change . . . . Once the applicant 
successfully meets this initial burden, however, the objectors have the burden of going forward 
with evidence of injury to existing water rights. When contrary evidence of injury has been 
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tasked with proving a negative and the result is often an extended and 
expensive hearing where experts battle over evidence of any possible injury 
to existing users.263 On the one hand, it might be argued that the burden is 
rightly placed on the party who proposes to alter the stream to the potential 
detriment of existing users. But on the other hand, as the owner of the 
water, the state has a responsibility to ensure that private uses of water are 
serving the broad public interests. Fulfilling that responsibility may be 
compromised by a system that makes it harder and more expensive to move 
water to places where it is most needed. 
While shifting the burden of proof to the person claiming injury 
arguably makes sense in all water transfer cases, a less radical change might 
simply provide that where a party seeks to transfer conserved water and 
where that party agrees to dedicate 10% of the conserved water amount back 
to the stream, the burden of proving injury as a result of that transfer should 
be placed on the party claiming injury. 
E. Loosen the Rules on Speculation for Conserved Water Transfers 
Elwood Mead, the water resources visionary who served as the first 
State Engineer in Wyoming and as the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Reclamation during the construction of the Hoover Dam,264 is well-known for 
decrying the risks of speculation in water.265 Water transfers were viewed by 
Mead as the chief vehicle for promoting speculation and it was perhaps for 
that reason that the original 1890 Wyoming water law, which was largely 
drafted by Mead, contained an outright prohibition on transfers.266 Wyoming, 
 
presented, the ultimate burden of showing absence of injurious effect by a preponderance of 
the evidence continues to rest on the applicant.”) 
 263  PETER W. CULP ET AL., STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW 
THE MARKET CAN MITIGATE WATER SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 15 (2014), available at 
http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/market_mitigate_water_shortage_in_west_
paper_glennon_final.pdf.  
 264  WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: ORIGINS AND 
GROWTH TO 1945 235, 300–01 (2006); Mark Squillace, Water Marketing in Wyoming, 31 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 865, 867 (1989). The lake behind the Hoover Dam is, of course, named for Mead. Id. at 866–
67 n.9. 
 265  See Squillace supra note 264 at 884 (discussing Mead’s conviction that improperly 
managed water transfers could encourage speculation); Mark Squillace, One Hundred Years of 
Wyoming Water Law, 26 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 93, 98 (1991) (citing Mead’s concerns about 
water speculation as a reason water transfers in Wyoming have always been problematic). 
Given the comparisons with Australia drawn in this Article, it is interesting to note that Mead 
spent eight years in Victoria, Australia, as the Chairman of the Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission of the state of Victoria from 1907 to 1915. Arthur W. MacMahon, Selection and 
Tenure of Bureau Chiefs in the National Administration of the United States, 20 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 548, 564 (1926). 
 266  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (LexisNexis 2013) (“Water rights for the direct use of the 
natural unstored flow of any stream cannot be detached from the lands, place or purpose for 
which they are acquired.”). In 1973, Wyoming amended its laws to specifically provide for 
transfers under limited conditions. WYO. STAT. ANN. 41-3-104 (LexisNexis 2013). But the State’s 
skepticism about transfers, which traces back to Mead, remains a powerful influence on 
Wyoming state policy. See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d. 557, 
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however, is not alone in its hostility toward speculation in water and the 
history of western water law is replete with failed efforts by water 
entrepreneurs to obtain water rights for speculative purposes.267 Yet it is far 
from clear that the current hostility towards speculation serves any 
constructive purpose. To be sure, states are rightly concerned about 
speculators developing a monopoly over water resources but states could 
easily establish rules limiting ownership of water to a minor percentage 
within any single basin, and strict enforcement of abandonment and 
forfeiture laws can help ensure incentives to put the water to a productive 
use.268 
 
563 (Wyo. 1978) (explaining that Wyoming statute would only allow an appropriator to obtain a 
water right to the extent that the water right can be put to a beneficial use). See generally 
Squillace, Water Marketing in Wyoming, supra note 264; Squillace, One Hundred Years of 
Wyoming Water Law, supra note 265; Mark Squillace, A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law, 24 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 307 (1989). 
 267  See, e.g., Stephanie Landry, The Galloway Proposal and Colorado Water Law: The Limits 
of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation, 25 NAT’L RES. J. 961, 961 (1985) (detailing the legal and 
political obstacles to a plan to build the largest reservoirs in Colorado to store water for leasing 
to San Diego); High Plains A & M v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 717 n.2 
(Colo. 2005) (“[T]he privilege of diversion is granted only for uses truly beneficial, and not for 
purposes of speculation.” (quoting Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 
1892))); see also In re Application for Water Rights, 307 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Colo. 2013) (finding 
that an applicant must show intent not based on speculative sale or transfer, and that the 
applicant can and will complete appropriation); Upper Yampa Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
Dequine Family L.L.C., 249 P.3d 794, 798–99 (Colo. 2011) (holding that governmental entities 
have an exception to anti-speculation by showing 1) a reasonable water supply planning period, 
2) substantiated population growth projections, and 3) the amount of available unappropriated 
water is reasonably necessary, above its current water supply and that no appropriation can be 
based on sale or transfer, notwithstanding a contract, in the absence of a specific plan and 
intent for application to beneficial use); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout 
Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 317, 320 (Colo. 2007) (approving a limited government exception to 
anti speculation doctrine with a 50-year planning period for government agencies’ securing 
water supplies); Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for 
Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEVADA L.J. 994, 1000–01 (2008) (detailing resistance from 
Colorado River Basin states regarding Chevron’s plan to lease water to Nevada).  
 268  Some states like Colorado might consider tightening their abandonment and forfeiture 
rules to address the speculation problem. Colorado, for example, only provides for 
abandonment, which requires an intent to abandon. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (requiring 
a rebuttable presumption of abandonment, with special circumstances possible to negate 
finding of intent to abandon). Colorado has allowed a company unable to finance the 
infrastructure to use its water right to sell the water despite a claim of abandonment. East Twin 
Lakes Ditches & Water Works, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Lake Cty., 76 P.3d 918, 919–20 
(Colo. 2003). Washington and Montana also use rebuttable presumptions. See Okanogan 
Wilderness League v. Town of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732, 739 (Wash. 1997) (describing a rebuttable 
presumption of abandonment after long periods of nonuse as “the general rule in western water 
law”); 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch, 666 P.2d 215, 217 (Mont. 1983) (finding that after 40 years of non-
use, a rebuttable presumption is raised and burden is shifted to the nonuser to show there was 
no intent to abandon). Other states allow defenses to forfeiture that include drought or 
unavailability of water, active service in the military, legal proceedings, legally imposed 
production or acreage quotas, and other reasons that warrant nonuse. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN 45-189(E) (providing that drought, military service in crisis, operation of legal proceedings, 
and water use restrictions are sufficient cause for nonuse); N.M. STAT. ANN. 72-5-28 
(circumstances beyond the control of the owner not cause for forfeiture); IDAHO CODE 42-
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Speculation in water rights was of far greater concern during the early 
settlement of the American West when valuable new water rights were still 
being acquired. As Elwood Mead noted: 
If [the right to transfer water] is [sustained], water rights . . . will become 
personal property. The water of the public streams will become a form of 
merchandise, and limitations to beneficial use a mere legal fiction. It will render 
futile and useless the requirement of the State statute that the lands to which 
the appropriation is attached must be described in certificates, because the 
right can be separated from this land without any legal formality as soon as the 
certificate is recorded. If water is to be so bartered and sold, then the public 
should not give streams away, but should auction them off to the highest 
bidder.269 
At the time that Mead was writing, water resource managers were rightly 
concerned that some water users would claim more water than they needed 
for their initial water allocations with the hope, and perhaps the expectation, 
that they would be able to sell any water they did not need.270 But our 
western water resources programs have long since transitioned from an era 
of allocation to an era of reallocation.271 And in an era of reallocation, 
concerns about speculation are far more suspect because they may interfere 
with the efficient operation of water markets. In the conserved water 
context for example, allowing an entrepreneur to pay a farmer to engage in 
DI in exchange for providing the investor with some portion of the 
conserved water rights could move the states much more quickly and 
efficiently to embrace conserved water transfers. Once again, Australia’s 
experience suggests that speculation in water does not pose significant 
problems and may help the markets function more efficiently.272 
Current prior appropriation law largely relies upon the doctrine of 
beneficial use to deny speculative water right claims. As Colorado Supreme 
Court Justice Gregory Hobbs noted in High Plains A & M, L.L.C. v. 
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, “[a]ctual beneficial use 
is the basis, measure, and limit of an appropriation.”273 Thus, when an 
 
222(2)–(3), 42-223(6) (preventing forfeiture due to circumstances beyond rights owner’s 
control). 
 269  Squillace, Water Marketing in Wyoming, supra note 264, at 884 (quoting ELWOOD MEAD, 
IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 264 (1903)). 
 270  See id. (discussing Mead’s concerns about water speculation). 
 271  See Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 413, 413–14 (1989) (“[W]e are entering an era of water ‘reallocation’ in the West 
that is just as significant as the allocation era of the previous century, and which presents as 
many difficult questions.”). 
 272  In Australia, speculative behavior has occasionally been raised as a concern for water 
markets but such problems have not been borne out. This may be because of the fact that the 
MurrayDarling Basin supports a large number of equivalent entitlements in given classes and a 
deep and well informed market. In practical terms, a water entitlement can only yield value to 
the owner if the water is either used or sold to a buyer willing to accept the price. At this point 
every owner has their asset again evaluated by the market.  
 273  120 P.3d 710, 719 (Colo. 2005). 
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applicant for a water right is unable to demonstrate how and where it will 
use the water, the courts often reject the application on the grounds that is 
speculative.274 
Wholesale rejection of the anti-speculation doctrine is not necessary, 
however, to allow conserved water transfers to go forward—even where the 
applicant has not identified a final place or type of end use. Rather, the 
States might consider allowing such transfers to go forward so long as the 
conserved water is deposited in a state water exchange for the appropriate 
water basin. This would promote the sensible state policy of making water 
more readily available to address short- and long-term needs without 
abandoning the anti-speculation doctrine in its entirety. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Innovative water conservation strategies supported by arrangements 
that allow saved water to be transferred to other uses hold great promise for 
addressing stresses on water supplies caused by climate change and 
overuse. As Australia’s experience shows, such strategies are likely to prove 
more efficient and more protective of environmental values than water 
development projects that are often promoted as a necessary response to 
water supply stresses. In order for these strategies to succeed, however, 
certain legal and institutional obstacles to transferring the water saved must 
be overcome. 
Recognizing the potential efficiencies that might be achieved with 
robust water markets, water experts and policymakers have worked hard to 
overcome these obstacles for many years but they have had little to show for 
their efforts. To be sure, transfers are occurring in the western United States 
as they have been for well over 100 years, but the market has not developed 
in a way that affords sufficient assurances for parties that need to know that 
water resources will be available when and where they are needed. 
One possible way to reinvigorate water markets is to focus on the 
transfer of conserved water. Conserved water transfers raise far fewer 
objections than other forms of water transfers because they allow farmers to 
keep farming and they can be designed to be accomplished quickly and 
efficiently. That is not to say that implementing programs that promote such 
transfers will be easy or without political costs. But as our water systems 
become increasingly stressed, we must look more closely at creative 
solutions that are capable of addressing our present and future water needs 
without upending the entire water rights system. They just might work. 
 
 
 274  See Landry, supra note 267, at 1010 n.107 (providing examples of several courts applying 
the anti speculation doctrine to proposed water rights transfers). 
